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 IS HINDSIGHT 20-20? RECONSIDERING THE
 IMPORTANCE OF PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
 Kirsten Matoy Carlson
 Many constitutional orders, including the United States, have yet to
 determine the legal and political status of pre-constitutional documents written
 prior to the enactment of a final constitution. This article argues that pre
 constitutional documents should be critically analyzed by their respective
 constitutional communities. It maintains that pre-constitutional documents play
 a key role in constitutional orders by identifying conflicts that remain over time
 and contends that critical analysis of these documents facilitates deeper
 understandings of constitutional politics. It demonstrates how pre
 constitutional documents can be used as diagnostic tools for identifying and
 better understanding persistent constitutional tensions through a case study of
 a Peruvian pre-constitutional document. The case study indicates that even
 underappreciated pre-constitutional documents can broaden understandings of
 contemporary constitutional politics. The article concludes that pre
 constitutional documents play a role in current constitutionalism and that legal
 communities should consider them more seriously.
 Introduction
 Shooting off bottle rockets, marching in ticker tape parades, waving the stars
 and stripes, and watching spectacular red, white, and blue fireworks explode in
 the dark sky, every small town, big city, remote village and cattle crossing
 stops momentarily in midsummer to celebrate the anniversary ofthe signing of
 the Declaration of Independence.1 Yet we do not pause for a second thought
 1. Ph.D. candidate, Department of Political Science, University of Michigan. B. A., Johns
 Hopkins University (1997); M.A., Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand (Fulbright
 Scholar) (1999); J.D., University of Michigan (2003). My research was supported by a Clara
 Belfield and Henry Bates Overseas Fellowship from the Center for International and
 Comparative Law at the University of Michigan Law School. I extend special thanks to Milner
 Ball, Sarah Chambers, Matthew Fletcher, Cameron Fraser, Elizabeth Kronk, Carlton F.W.
 Larson, Craig Lawler, Joan Sitomer, Mark Tushnet, Monika Tutschka, John Ursu, and James
 Boyd White for reading earlier drafts of this article.
 1. Americans have celebrated July 4th since 1777. For a brief history of early Fourth of
 July festivities, see Carlton F.W. Larson, The Declaration of Independence: A 225th
 Anniversary Re-Interpretation, 76 WASH. L. Rev. 701, 750-51 (2001).
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 on the anniversary ofthe signing or ratification of our Constitution,2 and while
 we call Columbus Day a federal holiday, no one celebrates it. Rather we
 identify our founding and project all of our patriotism and our love of country
 and Constitution onto the festivities ofthe Fourth of July.
 The focal point for our story of origin is not the Constitution or the discovery
 of the New World by Europeans but the Declaration of Independence.3 We
 identify our origin with a moment in between discovery and the formation of
 our constitutional government and hail it as both the origin of our presence here
 and our Constitution. Our constitutional story thus begins before the drafting
 of our Constitution with an earlier pre-constitutional document, which we
 recognize every July 4th as not just a declaration of independence, but as a
 symbol of the beginning of the constitutional democracy that many proudly
 assert to be the best in the world.
 Despite our July Fourth festivities and the widespread public attention given
 to the Declaration of Independence, its place within our constitutional system
 continues to be widely debated.4 While it is often invoked rhetorically, the
 Declaration of Independence is not universally accepted as a binding legal
 document and its precedential value within our constitutional system remains
 uncertain.5
 The obscure place of the Declaration of Independence within U.S.
 constitutionalism is not unique. Texts written prior to formal constitutional
 creation, or pre-constitutional documents, exist in many states and, like the
 Declaration of Independence, encapsulate the values underlying the
 constitutional system.6 Some of them, like the Declaration of Independence,
 the British Magna Carta, and the French Declaration ofthe Rights of Man and
 the Citizen, have grabbed the political community's imagination and have
 tremendous rhetorical value in terms of constitutional politics and debates.7
 2. /?at750.
 3. Ironically, the discovery ofthe "New World" hints at one of our longest, lingering
 constitutional questions, namely the constitutional status of American Indians and Indian tribes.
 See generally VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND
 Constitutional Tribulations (1999); Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional
 Possibilities, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2280, 2280 (1989) (detailing how American Indians remain
 outside of and problematic for the United States' constitutional narrative).
 4. Larson, supra note 1, at 701 -02; see also Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution
 Away from the Courts (1999).
 5. Larson, supra note 1, at 701 -02.
 6. Introduction to Constitutions in Democratic Politics 7 (Vernon Bogdanor ed.,
 1988). [hereinafter Bogdanor].
 7. Id.
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 Others have not been remembered so gloriously, if at all. New Zealand's
 Treaty of Waitangi, for instance, was declared a legal nullity and spent several
 decades buried in the basement of a rotting government building before being
 revived as an important foundational text.8 Still others remain buried in
 constitutional history and rarely mentioned in contemporary constitutional
 dialogues. While these pre-constitutional documents vary in rhetorical use and
 value, their place within contemporary constitutional politics and law remains
 largely unknown.
 At the same time, the last two decades have witnessed a worldwide surge in
 constitutionalism, including the creation of new pre-constitutional and
 constitutional documents. States in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, and
 most recently, the Middle East, have re-invented their governing structures and
 political communities through the revision of old or the creation of new
 constitutions.9 As constitutionalism spreads around the globe, more and more
 pre-constitutional documents are drafted as precursors to final constitutions.
 The post constitution-making status of pre-constitutional documents is rarely
 addressed by the new constitutional order. Whether pre-constitutional
 documents are popularly exalted, rarely remembered, or were written
 yesterday, their status within constitutional politics and law is often unclear.
 The surge in constitutionalism has lead to a similar increase in comparative
 constitutional scholarship.10 Legal scholars and political scientists have
 demonstrated a renewed academic interest in the study of constitutionalism.
 Scholars have analyzed the constitution-making processes in South Africa,
 8. Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi x (I.H.
 Kawharued., 1989).
 9. See, e.g., Cletus Gregor Bari?, Pueblos Ind?genas y Derechos
 Constitucionales en America Latina: Un Panorama 474 (2000); Donna Lee Van Cott,
 The Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America
 (2000); Herman Schwartz, The Struggle for Constitutional Justice in Post
 Communist Europe (2000); Richard Spitz & Matthew Chaskalson, The Politics of
 Transition: A Hidden History of South Africa's Negotiated Settlement (2000).
 10. See, e.g., Bari?, supra note 9, at 474; Van Cott, supra note 9; Schwartz, supra note
 9; Spitz & Chaskalson, supra note 9; Alec Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges:
 Constitutional Politics in Europe (2000); Heinz Klug, Participating in Design:
 Constitution-Making in South Africa, 3 REV. CONST. STUDIES 1 (1996); GARY JEFFREY
 Jacobsohn, Apple of Gold: Constitutionalism in Israel and the United States (1993).
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 Europe, and Latin America,11 studied the increased development of
 constitutional courts,12 and engaged in cross-constitutional comparisons.13
 The existence of so many constitutions developing out of written pre
 constitutional norms, and the renewed interest in the serious study of
 constitutional politics, makes this an opportune moment to address the question
 of the place that pre-constitutional documents should have in modern
 constitutional orders. Should pre-constitutional documents be largely forgotten
 and discarded, or do they retain some inherent value that suggests that they
 deserve the attention that at least some of them have received publicly? Is it
 enough to acknowledge that these documents exist and use them rhetorically?
 Do they provide key insights into constitutional law and politics that mandate
 more critical retrospective analysis? What status should we accord these texts
 today?
 Although these questions remain unanswered, some scholars have noted the
 importance of pre-constitutional documents and a few have even been using
 pre-constitutional documents to understand contemporary constitutional orders
 better.14 United States constitutional law scholars, such as Jack Balkin, Milner
 Ball, Carlton Larson, and Mark Tushnet have argued extensively for taking the
 Declaration of Independence more seriously.15 Jack Balkin argues that U.S.
 constitutionalism can only be understood in light of the Declaration of
 Independence, which creates the equality narrative central to U.S. constitutional
 aspirations.16 Milner Ball also perceives the Declaration of Independence as
 key to constitutional equality in the U.S. He traces the extension of equality to
 groups not originally included in either the Declaration or the Constitution, and
 then asserts that the ideals ofthe Declaration remain problematic for American
 Indians.17 While he agrees that the Declaration deserves more legal recognition
 as a foundational American document, Carlton Larson disputes Balkin and
 Ball's identification of equality as the central message in the Declaration and
 11. See, e.g., Van Cott, supra note 9; Schwartz, supra note 9; Spitz & Chaskalson,
 supra note 9.
 12. See, e.g., SCHWARTZ, supra note 9; Stone Sweet, supra note 10.
 13. See, e.g., Van COTT, supra note 9; JACOBSOHN, swpra note 10.
 14. To some extent, even emerging constitutional democracies have found pre
 constitutional documents as useful in the creation of final constitutions. South African
 constitution-makers, for example, used their Interim Constitution as a diagnostic tool to identify
 problems that would need to be resolved in the final constitution.
 15. J.M. Balkin, The Declaration and the Promise of a Democratic Culture, 4 WlDENER
 L. Symp. J. 167 (1999); Tushnet, supra note 4; Ball, supra note 3; Larson, supra note 1.
 16. Balkin, supra note 15, at 167.
 17. Ball, supra note 3, at 2296.
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 asserts that its deepest principles are about the right of American people to self
 government.18 Finally, Mark Tushnet contends that the Declaration of
 Independence and the Preamble to the Constitution form the "thin
 constitution," which should guide our constitutional dialogue because it
 emphasizes the values underlying our constitutional system and creates us as
 a people.19 While these scholars present varying views ofthe Declaration of
 Independence, they all suggest that it plays an important role in U.S.
 constitutionalism.20
 Scholars of U.S. law are not the only ones to observe the relevance of pre
 constitutional documents to contemporary constitutional politics. In his study
 of comparative constitutional politics, Gary Jacobsohn uses the U.S.
 Declaration of Independence and the Israeli Declaration of Independence as
 departure points to discuss the contemporary theory and practice of
 constitutionalism in the United States and Israel.21 He argues that these
 documents are key to understanding contemporary constitutionalism because
 they "affix a particular political-moral character to their respective polities."22
 Canadian legal scholar, John Borrows, identifies another pre-constitutional
 document, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 as a "fundamental document" that
 remains constitutionally relevant today.23 He argues that the Royal
 Proclamation is the basis ofthe constitutional relationship between Aboriginal
 18. Lawson, supra note 1, at 783.
 19. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 11-12.
 20. Debates have also developed over how and when to use other pre-constitutional
 documents, especially in interpreting the U. S. Constitution. Vasan Kesavan and Michael Stokes
 Paulsen discuss the debate over the legal use of documents created during the secret drafting
 ofthe Constitution. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force ofthe
 Constitution's Secret Drafting, 91 Geo. L.J. 1113,1113-14 (2003). Similarly, scholars have
 debated how to treat other documents related to the Constitutional Convention. See, e.g., Seth
 Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Article I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why Hollingsworth v.
 Virginia Was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha Was Wrongly Reasoned, 83 TEX. L.
 REV. 1265,1311-15(2005); Vasan Kesavan, When Did the Articles of Confederation Cease to
 Be Law?, 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 35 (2002); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The First
 "Establishment" Clause: Article VII and the Post Constitutional Confederation, 78 NOTRE
 Dame L. Rev. 83,85 (2002). Unlike these scholars, I am not entering into the debates over the
 role that various documents may play in the originalist method of interpreting the U.S.
 Constitution. I am more interested in what these pre-constitutional documents tell us about the
 development of constitutional politics than whether we should use them to interpret
 constitutions.
 21. Jacobsohn, supra note 10, at 4-5.
 22. Id. at 5.
 23. John Borrows, Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government
 and the Royal Proclamation, 28 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1994).
 6  AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
 peoples and Canada and should continue to guide that constitutional
 relationship.24 Similarly, New Zealand scholars have noted the reemergence
 ofthe Treaty of Waitangi as a constitutional document there. Long forgotten
 by the New Zealand government, the Treaty of Waitangi remained central to
 the claims of Maaori, and their continual reassertion of their rights under the
 Treaty has led to its established place as a foundational document in New
 Zealand.25
 While these scholars suggest that particular pre-constitutional documents
 should be taken more seriously, they have not considered pre-constitutional
 documents generally. My work in relation to theirs demonstrates the relevance
 of pre-constitutional documents. I build on and use their work to suggest that
 pre-constitutional documents are a genre of constitutional documents that exist
 across several constitutional orders. I maintain that legal, political, and
 academic communities have often overlooked the relevance of pre
 constitutional documents to contemporary constitutional politics.
 This article invites legal and political communities to think more critically
 about pre-constitutional documents and their legal and political status within
 contemporary constitutional orders. I argue that critical analysis of pre
 constitutional documents in a constitutional order may be central to
 understanding major constitutional issues in that polity today. Pre
 constitutional documents often emphasize tensions that were present at
 constitution-making and that remain unresolved. They can be used as
 diagnostic tools to identify and to understand these tensions better and may
 assist constitutional orders in addressing constitutional tensions identified at but
 not resolved since constitution-making. Consequently, it is important that these
 pre-constitutional documents receive critical analysis like constitutions and
 other legal materials. Thus, I develop a framework for determining which pre
 constitutional documents should be taken seriously within a constitutional
 order. Finally, I suggest that even some less well known documents may serve
 as diagnostic tools for identifying longstanding constitutional conflicts.
 In Part I, I argue that pre-constitutional documents deserve to be critically
 analyzed like other constitutional documents because even underappreciated
 pre-constitutional documents may be used as diagnostic tools to identify and
 understand more completely longstanding constitutional tensions and provide
 key insights into contemporary constitutionalism. I suggest that constitutional
 24. Id. at 4-5.
 25. See, e.g., P.G. McHugh, Tales of Constitutional Origin and Crown Sovereignty in New
 Zealand, 52 U. Toronto L.J. 69 (2002); Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives ofthe
 Treaty of Waitangi (I.H. Kawharued., 1989).
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 systems can only determine the appropriate legal status of these documents
 after they have seriously considered their content and context. In Part ?I, I use
 a pre-constitutional document, an 1822 letter from the Constitutional Congress
 of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces, to show how pre-consitutional
 documents should be analyzed. My analysis ofthe letter illustrates how even
 inadvertently overlooked pre-constitutional documents, which no one expects
 to have any relevance today, can be used retrospectively as diagnostic tools.
 I critically analyze the text ofthe 1822 letter and show how it illustrates the
 tensions inherent in the relationship between Andean indigenous peoples and
 Creoles during Peruvian independence. Then I explore the legacy of this
 tension between indigenous peoples and the state in later constitutional
 discourses in Peru. I suggest that the 1822 letter can be used retrospectively to
 better understand the contemporary constitutional conflict between indigenous
 peoples and the state. I conclude that pre-constitutional documents matter and
 that using these documents as diagnostic tools increases our understanding of
 persistent constitutional tensions and may help to resolve them.
 /. Pre-Constitutional Documents as Diagnostic Tools
 In this Part, I argue that pre-constitutional documents matter because they
 may be useful as diagnostic tools for identifying tensions that emerged at the
 time ofthe constitutional order's origin and that have remained unresolved and
 problematic ever since. First, I define pre-constitutional documents as a genre
 of constitutional documents. Second, I contend that pre-constitutional
 documents deserve to be critically analyzed as legal documents because they
 often identify longstanding problems within the constitutional order. Finally,
 I suggest that identification of these unresolved problems and an understanding
 of their constitutional origins may be key to a constitutional order's attempts
 to resolve them.
 Pre-constitutional documents are texts composed before the drafting of a
 final constitution that relate to the constitution-making or state formation
 process. Often they present the more aspirational goals of the political
 community that is being established. Pre-constitutional documents may come
 in a variety of forms, including, but not limited to, declarations of
 independence,26 treaties between peoples,27 proclamations,28 interim
 26. See, e.g., The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); Israeli Declaration
 of Independence (1948).
 27. See, e.g., Treaty of Waitangi (N.Z. 1840).
 28. See, e.g., ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763 (U.K. 1763).
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 constitutions,29 declarations of rights,30 and essays and records relating to the
 constitution-making process.31 Pre-constitutional documents also have a
 variety of purposes. Some, like the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the
 Israeli Declaration of Independence, assert the creation of a new governmental
 entity.32 Others, like the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
 Magna Carta, list the rights of individuals against the sovereign.33 A third
 category, including the Treaty of Waitangi and the Royal Proclamation of
 1763, define the relationship between a settler colony and the indigenous
 inhabitants ofthe land.34 Pre-constitutional documents may serve other primary
 functions as well.35
 Pre-constitutional documents constitute their own genre of constitutional
 documents because they are written at the commencement ofthe constitutional
 project and directly relate to that project. They tend to be initial texts which
 foreshadow the creation of a more definitive constitution (either written or
 unwritten) and outline the more aspirational goals ofthe political community.
 Unlike constitutions which "regulate the allocation of functions, powers and
 duties among the various agencies and officers of government, and define[] the
 relationships between these and the public,"36 pre-constitutional documents are
 generally more fluid in their content and as noted above, may address more
 aspirational goals ofthe political community.
 The unclear legal status of pre-constitutional documents also distinguishes
 them from constitutions and statutes.37 While constitutions and statutes are
 laws on the books to be strictly interpreted and used by the courts, pre
 constitutional documents tend to play a more fluid role politically and legally.
 As the debate over the central principles ofthe Declaration of Independence
 shows, pre-constitutional documents can be used in different ways by diverse
 peoples to tell stories about the original constitutional moment and subsequent
 29. See, e.g., Const, of Republic of South Africa (1994).
 30. See, e.g., Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France 1789);
 Magna Carta (U.K. 1215).
 31. See, e.g., The Federalist Papers (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
 32. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776); Israeli Declaration of
 Independence (1948).
 33. Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen (France 1789); Magna
 Carta (U.K. 1215).
 34. Treaty of Waitangi (N.Z. 1840); Royal Proclamation of 1763 (U.K. 1763).
 35. For example, the primary purpose ofthe Federalist Papers was to advocate for the
 ratification ofthe U.S. Constitution. See generally THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, supra note 31.
 36. Bogdanor, supra note 6, at 4.
 37. Thanks to John Ursu for reminding me of this distinction.
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 ones. Unlike the Constitution, which has gained authoritative meaning through
 court interpretation, the Declaration and other pre-constitutional documents are
 more indeterminate and open to interpretation outside the courts. For instance,
 President Abraham Lincoln used the Declaration of Independence to reunite the
 Union during the Civil War38 and President George W. Bush has hailed it as
 introducing god into our constitutionalism.
 Pre-constitutional documents should be taken seriously within contemporary
 constitutional orders because they facilitate a fuller comprehension of
 constitutional formation by contextualizing early constitutional tensions. This
 contextualization provides a lens for understanding later constitutional
 dialogues, especially those that emerge out of initial constitutional tensions. As
 prologues to constitutions, pre-constitutional documents allow for
 contextualization and thus, better understanding of the moment of
 constitutional formation. They often (intentionally or unintentionally) highlight
 tensions in the constitutional project that may not be resolved by the final
 constitution.
 Constitutions do not exist in isolation, but rather emerge through an
 evolutionary process concerned not only with the actual structure and function
 of the government but also with the creation of the political community.39
 Often constitution-making is part ofthe imagination and creation of a unified
 political community,40 and the constitution itself contributes to the formation
 of this identity.41 Key to this evolution are pre-constitutional documents, which
 set the stage for the rest of the constitution-making process. Because pre
 constitutional documents play a formative role in the origins of a constitutional
 order, they provide insights into the original tensions faced by constitution
 makers?where these tensions came from, how they arose, and why they were
 central to the original constitution-making project. Gary Lawson and Guy
 Seidmen note how important the events occuring during constitution-making
 may be when they state, "[S]ome theories of governmental legitimacy might
 turn on the precise sequence of events in the founding era, so it is important
 that those events be properly recorded and understood."42 Pre-constitutional
 38. Ball, supra note 3, at 2282-85.
 39. For more on the evolutionary creation of constitutions, see Andrew Arato, Forms of
 Constitution Making and Theories of Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. Rev. 191, 198-201 (1995).
 40. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and
 Spread of Nationalism 47 (1983).
 41. Larry Cata Backer, Forward: Constituting Nations - Veils, Disguises, Masquerades,
 20 Penn. St. Int'lL. Rev. 329, 330 (2002) ("The instrumentalities of constitutionalism and
 self-determination have been used to constitute nations where none had existed before ....").
 42. Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did the Constitution Become Law?, 11 Notre
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 documents help us to understand more completely founding era events with all
 their nuances and complexities.
 Pre-constitutional documents may also provide a lens for understanding later
 constitutional dialogues, especially if these debates involve issues that emerged
 but were not resolved during constitution-making. In this sense, pre
 constitutional documents can serve as diagnostic tools for identifying and
 understanding constitutional tensions that persist long after the constitution is
 written and enacted.
 By saying that pre-constitutional documents may be used as diagnostic tools,
 I make two suggestions about the place of pre-constitutional documents in
 contemporary constitutionalism. First, pre-constitutional documents should
 serve as more than mere rhetorical window dressing on our understandings of
 constitutionalism and they deserve to be critically analyzed like other
 constitutional and legal documents. In saying that pre-constitutional documents
 should be critically analyzed, I mean they need to be evaluated to determine
 whether they can be used as diagnostic tools for identifying and understanding
 contemporary constitutional tensions. This is not to say, however, that pre
 consitutional documents should become definitive, binding legal texts. I
 simply argue that constitutional polities need to pay enough attention to them
 to determine the appropriate legal, political, and cultural status to be accorded
 to them. Not all pre-constitutional documents may be useful as diagnostic tools
 or salient to the constitutional community today. Many may not be. But if pre
 constitutional documents are not taken seriously, we may not know if they
 should be or even be able to determine their full import for contemporary
 constitutionalism. Further, the pre-constitutional documents that inform
 constitutionalism today may not be the ones we think or that have
 retrospectively been remembered or revered.
 Critical analysis will reveal which of these documents remain salient today
 and how they relate to contemporary constitutionalism. Such analysis will help
 constitutional scholars and practitioners to contextualize and better understand
 constitutional formation even if they discover that some pre-constitutional
 documents are not relevant today. Critical analysis should include a close
 reading ofthe text, including how the text imagines its own project, constitutes
 a community, represents the legal, political, social and cultural universe, and
 presents the authoritative value of its own arguments.43 Through critical
 Dame L. Rev. 1,3(2001).
 43. For more information on how to read texts critically, see James Boyd White, When
 Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and Reconstitutions of Language,
 Character, and Community 3-23 (1982).
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 analysis, we may find that pre-constitutional documents remain relevant in
 unforeseen ways or identify new insights in them.44 I model critical analysis
 in depth in Part H.A.
 Second, I am suggesting that these documents cannot be viewed in a vacuum
 but must be contextualized at the moment of origin and juxtaposed against later
 constitutional debates to reveal their full importance. In addition to a close
 reading ofthe text, our critical analysis of these pre-constitutional documents
 should include a survey of other key documents in the constitutional order to
 determine how they relate to the original document. This survey will indicate
 whether and how pre-constitutional documents remain relevant and contribute
 to contemporary constitutional politics. Part ILB provides an example of how
 a pre-constitutional document can be contextualized and compared to later
 constitutional debates.
 The re-emergence of pre-constitutional documents on national political
 scenes demonstrates the importance of critically analyzing these documents.
 Recent critical analysis of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand and the
 Royal Proclamation of 1763 in Canada has illustrated how these two
 documents remain central to contemporary constitutional politics.
 In New Zealand, the Maaori have long argued that the Treaty of Waitangi
 was key to the political community, but it did not receive widespread attention
 until the Waitangi Tribunal started critically analyzing it in the early 1980s.
 The Waitangi Tribunal, which was created in 1975 as a commission of inquiry
 to hear Maaori grievances against the government, issued a number of reports
 in the late 1980s and early 1990s.45 The reports critically analyzed the Treaty
 and the Treaty relationship between Maaori and the Crown.46 The Waitangi
 Tribunal condemned the Government for violating Treaty promises and
 recommended that that Treaty be considered more seriously as a legally binding
 foundational document.47 This critical analysis of the Treaty raised general
 44. Larson argues that a thorough analysis ofthe Declaration of Independence helps us to
 better understand major issues in American public law. Larson, supra note 1, at 701. He
 suggests that contrary to its usual interpretation as a declaration of thirteen states, the
 Declaration was a declaration of a single unified people. Id.
 45. M.H. Durie, Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self
 Determination 184-85 (1998).
 46. See, e.g., Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi (1996);
 Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report (1991).
 47. See generally Paul Temm, The Waitangi Tribunal: The Conscience of the
 Nation (1990); Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Rhetoric Versus Reality: Sovereignty and Tino
 Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa New Zealand 104-12 ( 1999) (unpublished masters thesis, University
 of Victoria).
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 awareness of the Treaty's place in New Zealand and led to its
 acknowledgement as a foundational constitutional document.
 Similarly, critical analysis ofthe Royal Proclamation of 1763 in Canada has
 led to its recognition as an important part ofthe Canadian Constitution. Like
 the Maaori in New Zealand, First Nations in Canada have continually
 maintained that the Royal Proclamation is the cornerstone of their
 constitutional relationship with the Canadian government.48 Only recently,
 however, with the Royal Commission of Aboriginal Peoples' report on the
 status of the relationship between Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian
 government has the Royal Proclamation started to receive widespread attention
 as a constitutional document.49 Today Aboriginal peoples and the Canadian
 government are still defining their constitutional relationship, and the Royal
 Proclamation is increasing seen as relevant to this relationship.
 While these two examples show how the critical analysis of well-known pre
 constitutional documents reveals their contemporary constitutional importance,
 I contend that even less well-known documents may serve as diagnostic tools.
 In the next part, I critically analyze a more obscure pre-constitutional document
 from Peru. My critical analysis of this less well known document demonstrates
 how even less popularly known pre-constitutional documents can be used as
 diagnostic tools to identify and understand better tensions that emerged at the
 moment of constitutional origin and have remained unresolved.
 In arguing that pre-constitutional documents should be critically analyzed
 like other legal documents, I do not mean to suggest that they should also be
 given the same legal status. My point is simply that pre-constitutional
 documents should not be forgotten or ignored because they may provide
 important insights into contemporary constitutional debates. Pre-constitutional
 documents should be taken seriously because constitutional orders may learn
 a tremendous amount from them, but this is not to say that they should become
 definitive sources of constitutional law.
 It may, for instance, make more sense for pre-constitutional documents to
 play another, albeit important role, in the constitutional order. Consider the
 current place of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand. The Treaty has not
 been recognized as having definitive legal force, but it is often looked to for
 guiding principles in the Maaori-Crown relationship and used to interpret the
 law.50 Mark Tushnet argues that the Declaration of Independence should play
 48. Borrows, supra note 23, at 30.
 49. See generally 2 THE ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES ch. 3.2.3
 (1996).
 50. Durie, supra note 45, at 178.
 No. 1 ] PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS  13
 a similar role in the U.S. legal system.51 These views suggest that constitutional
 orders may view the interpretive force of pre-constitutional documents more as
 guidance than binding precedent. There may be reasons why a constitutional
 system would want to retain flexibility in how it views pre-constitutional
 documents because they tend to be more aspirational in nature.
 Canada has taken a different approach to the question ofthe legal force of
 the Royal Proclamation of 1763. Canadian Courts have viewed it as having
 "the force of a statute that has never been repealed,"52 and it is mentioned in the
 Canadian Constitution.53 Either way, it is up to each constitutional order to
 decide. Once pre-constitutional documents are critically analyzed and
 contextualized, the legal community in the constitutional order can determine
 what legal status and interpretive force to accord these documents.
 II. A Case in Point: The 1822 Peruvian Letter as a Diagnostic Tool
 Peru's constitutional story did not start with the promulgation ofthe first
 national constitution of an independent Peru in November 1823,54 but eleven
 months earlier with a letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the
 Indians of the interior provinces.55 Written soon after Peru was declared
 independent in 1821 and before the end ofthe revolutionary war, the 1822
 letter presents a story of origins; it seeks to separate Peru from its Spanish past
 and create something new. Constitutionalism in Peru, and particularly the
 relationship between indigenous peoples and the state, cannot be understood
 without reference to this first constitutional document. In this Part, I use the
 letter as a case study to illustrate how critical analysis of pre-constitutional
 51. TUSHNET, supra note 4, at 11-12.
 52. R. v. Bernard, [2003] 230 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 213 (Can.).
 53. Can. Const. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Charter of Rights and Freedom) ? 25.
 54. The Spanish Monarchy had promulagated an earlier constitution of its own in 1812.
 Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Monarqu?a Espa?ola (Mar. 19, 1812), at http://www.juridicas.
 unam.mx/infjur/leg/conshist/pd^l812.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
 55. I will interchangeably use the terms "indigenous" and "Indians." The definition of
 these terms is rather fluid, and Thornberry describes the incoherent use of "indigenous" in
 detail. Patrick Thornberry, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights 2 (2003).
 Currently, in Peru, the use of the term "indigenous" has replaced the more historically used
 "indios" because of the negative connotation attached to "indios." The same negative
 connotation is not attached to the English word "Indian." I have tried to use "Indian" in
 discussing Peruvian history to be true to the language at the time. See Charles F. Walker,
 Smoldering Ashes: Cuzco and the Creation of Republican Peru, 1780-1840, at 11
 (1999). I switch to using indigenous in Part II.B.2 to indicate the change in terminology with
 the development of indigenous movements around the beginning ofthe twentieth century.
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 documents reveals how they can be used as retrospective diagnostic tools for
 identifying constitutional tensions present at constitution-making that remain
 unresolved over time. In Part II.A, I critically analyze the 1822 letter by
 exploring its meaning and context. This analysis suggests that the 1822 letter
 can be used as a diagnostic tool to identify a key constitutional tension between
 indigenous peoples and the Peruvian state. In Part II.B, I read the 1822 letter
 against later constitutional documents to illustrate how this constitutional
 tension persists over time, and how the 1822 letter facilitates our improved
 understanding of it.
 A. The Mystery of Meaning: Critically Analyzing an Obscure Pre
 constitutional Document56
 Critical analysis of a pre-constitutional document starts with a close reading
 ofthe text. In this section, I start with some background to the creation ofthe
 1822 letter. Then I analyze the text, including how it imagines its own project,
 constitutes a community, represents the legal, political, social and cultural
 universe, and legitimates the authoritative value of its own arguments.
 As with our own story of origins, there are several options for a starting or
 defining moment in Peruvian history. Prior to the arrival ofthe Spanish, a vast
 Incan empire dominated South America from northern Chile, across Bolivia,
 Peru, and Ecuador into Colombia. The Spanish were astounded by this empire
 rich in silver and gold, and sought to claim its bounty for themselves.
 Spaniards settled along the coast and built Lima on the edge of a cliff, looking
 across the ocean rather than into the dense interior mountains and towards the
 capital ofthe Incans at Cuzco. After the Spanish finally defeated the Incans,57
 they centered their colonial empire, the Spanish Viceroyalty in Lima in 1535.58
 As the Spanish capital of Peru, Lima's architecture speaks to its Spanish
 origin?ornate porticos and balconies adorn the mustardy yellow Palace ofthe
 Government, which sits on the edge of a large, square Spanish-style plaza.
 The Spanish dealt severely and harshly with the Indians, extracting anything
 and everything they could from them.59 They separated Indians from colonial
 56. I primarily use my translation ofthe 1822 letter from Spanish to English to discuss its
 meaning. Any errors in translation are my own.
 57. For a history ofthe Spanish conquest and colonization of Peru, see James Lockhart,
 Spanish Peru 1532-1560: A Social History (2d ed. 1994).
 58. Walker, supra note 55, at 7-8.
 59. Lynch mentions that as late as 1800 Indians were subject to many forms of servitude.
 John Lynch, Spanish American Revolutions, 1808-1826, at 164 (1973). He argues that the
 cruelty of Spanish rule led to several Indian insurrections from 1756 to 1800. Id.
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 officials and created two republics; one for Indians and one for Spaniards.60
 The Indians periodically rebelled, reminding the Spanish of the legendary
 power and empire of the Incas.61
 Caught in the middle of this tumultuous dichotomy between Spanish
 colonials and Indians were Creoles.62 Creoles were the children of Spaniards
 born in America and they fit into neither the European nor Indian worlds
 created by the Spanish Viceroyalty.63 They were not Indians but the Spanish
 colonials did not consider them equals either. Creoles were treated as inferior
 due to their birth in America.64 They thus faced a largely schizophrenic reality
 in which they belonged to neither ofthe two republics created by the Spanish
 Empire.65
 The Spanish government largely collapsed in 1808 due to the arrival of
 Napoleon Bonaparte in Spain.66 By 1812, the Spanish had written the Cortes
 de Cadiz Constitution and declared America and Spain one nation.67 Under the
 Cortes de Cadiz, the Spanish allowed American representatives in the newly
 created Parliament, but it was not equal representation with their Spanish
 counterparts.68 These actions alienated Creoles and forced them to consider an
 identity separate from Spain.69 By the end ofthe eighteenth century, Creoles
 felt alienated from the Spanish by this dichotomy and some of them started to
 revolt against Spain.70
 Uprisings, led by Indians in the Cuzco region, and Creoles elsewhere, were
 increasingly common in the Spanish colonies in the early nineteenth century.71
 While many of these uprisings were not revolutionary in nature, by 1814 a
 60. Mark Thurner, From Two Republics to One Divided: Contradictions of
 Postcolonial Nationmaking in Andean Peru 5-7(1997).
 61. WALKER, supra note 55, at 16-54.
 62. Creoles were descendants born in the Americas of Spaniards who came to the new
 world. As Thurner notes, they were treated as inferior to Spaniards, who were born in Spain,




 66. Lynch, supra note 59, at 1.
 67. /?T. at 35.
 68. Id. For a complete discussion on how the events in Spain and the Cortes affected Peru,
 see Thurner, supra note 60, at 21-23.
 69. Lynch, supra note 59, at 35-36.
 70. For a discussion ofthe causes ofthe Wars of Independence in South America, see id.
 at 1-36.
 71. See generally id.
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 Creole revolution was in motion and had reached Peru.72 A year later, Lima
 emerged as the base for revolutionary activities in Peru.73 But the revolution,
 which was imported to Peru by Jos? de San Mart?n from the south and Sim?n
 Bol?var from the north, did not immediately take hold in Peru.74 Peruvian
 Creoles had divided loyalties.75 Some hoped to reform the Spanish Viceroyalty
 while others abandoned that idea and endeavored to create a new Peruvian
 nation.76
 Despite the arrival of the revolution, Peru would not officially declare
 independence from Spain until July 28, 1821?seven years after the war
 started.77 Shortly after Peruvian independence was declared, San Martin
 emerged as Peru's protector and exercised supreme civil and military power.78
 San Martin forged a new national identity for Peru by decreeing the end ofthe
 Indian tribute and other forms of compulsory servitude owed by the Indians,
 forbidding the use of the term "Indian", and urging the recognition of
 everyone?including Indians?as Peruvians on August 27, 1821.79
 The Viceroyalty relocated from Lima to Cuzco,80 and by September 1822,
 Creole revolutionaries had convened a congress in Lima to discuss the creation
 of a constitutional republic. This Constitutional Congress wrote a letter to the
 Indians of the interior provinces.81 The letter was written in Spanish and
 presumably, translated into Quechua not long after it was written.82 It is
 72. WALKER, supra note 55, at 84-85.
 73. Id. at 105.
 74. Id. at 106 ("Support for independence was lukewarm in Lima.").
 75. Much like English settlers and their descendants in North America, not all Creoles
 wanted to revolt from Spain. Id. at 106-07.
 76. Id.
 11. LYNCH, supra note 59, at 179.
 78. Id.
 79. M at 180.
 80. Walker, supra note 55, at 114-15.
 81. Although it is by no means self-evident that the text was written by Creole
 revolutionaries, the text itself and the presence of Creole revolutionaries at the Constitutional
 Congress in Lima suggest that the document was written by Creole revolutionaries. While
 Lynch does not mention the presence of Creole revolutionaries at the Constitutional Congress,
 he identifies two ofthe signers ofthe 1822 letter. LYNCH, supra note 59, at xv, xx. He
 describes Francisco Javier de Luna Pizarro as a "Peruvian priest and republican, not entirely
 consistent in his attitude towards independence, but in general liberal in politics, hostile to
 foreign intervention in Peru and to militarism." Id. at xv. Lynch identifies Jos? S?nchez
 Carri?n as a "Peruvian patriot and theoretician of independence; a liberal republican, he was a
 minister in Bolivar's administration in 1824 and in the Peruvian government in 1825." Id. at
 xx.
 82. Comisi?n Nacional del Sesquicentenario de la Independencia del Per?,
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 addressed to the Indians of the Andean Provinces. Its references to its own
 delivery and its translation into Quechua suggest that its final destination was
 the old Incan capital of Cuzco.
 Cuzco was a world away from Lima, and largely ravished by the war.83
 Although Cuzco was second only to Lima in terms of population and economic
 and political power, the city was largely inhabited by Indians.84 Indians had
 little to do with Creoles, and the Lima insurgents showed little interest in
 them.85 Indians existed in a completely separate social space. Geography
 enhanced this separation as a vast distance broken only by the peaks of the
 Andean mountains stretches between coastal Lima and highland Cuzco.86 The
 journey across this distance would have taken thirteen days.87 It would have
 been a long journey across linguistic, social, cultural, and geographic divides.
 Creole revolutionaries were imagining a new Peru in contrast to the rule of
 the Spanish Empire.88 They envisioned a new republic built on enlightened
 liberal ideals and citizens free from the dualism ofthe Spanish viceroyalty.89
 Antolog?a de la Independencia del Per? 511-12 (1959). My assumption is that the
 document was originally written in Spanish and then translated into Quechua. Linguistic
 anthropologist and Quechua specialist Bruce Mannheim agreed with this analysis. Interview
 with Bruce Mannheim at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan (Nov. 25, 2002).
 Based on this assumption I am translating the Spanish as the original version ofthe document.
 I have not reproduced the Quechua version because I have not attempted to translate it into
 either Spanish or English. The fact that the document was translated into Quechua raises many
 interesting questions about how well the document translated into and was understood in
 Quechua. The Quechua translation appears to be a Southern or Cusqueno dialect. Id. Bruce
 Mannheim suggested that several differences exist between the Spanish and Quechua versions
 ofthe document and that a comparison ofthe two yields even more interesting questions about
 the creation of dialogue and community in the document. Id. Such analysis, however, will not
 be done here as the focus will be on the Spanish text.
 83. Walker, supra note 55, at 109.
 84. Id. at 8.
 85. Id at 120.
 86. Thurner comments extensively on the geographic tension in Peru and how that maps
 on to social and cultural divides. Thurner, supra note 60, at 146-47 ("The clich? has been that
 there are two Perus: the "Peru profondo" ofthe "Indian" and "natural" Andean sierra, and the
 "modern Peru" ofthe "civilized," Westernized Creole coast.").
 87. Walker, supra note 55, at 10.
 88. Thurner, supra note 60, at 3 ("In Andean Peru, as elsewhere in Spanish America, the
 postcolonial history of nation-making was haunted by an earlier history of colonial state
 formation which, in the ambivalent fashion diagnostic of post-colonial nationalist predicaments
 everywhere, it was condemned to both negate and reclaim.").
 89. Id. at 5. For a discussion of Peru's long struggle towards democracy, see Cynthia
 McClintock, Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democratic, in DEMOCRACY IN
 Developing Countries: Latin America 313 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1999).
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 Their new republic would end the formal dualism created by the Spanish
 viceroyalty and be distinct from both the Indian and colonial republics ofthe
 Spanish empire.90 They rejected the recognition of separate Indian
 communities by the Spanish and focused on the inclusion of Indians as
 individuals.91
 While seeking to differentiate themselves from the Spanish, Creoles
 remembered the revolt led by Tupac Amaru in 1781-83 and were haunted by
 alternative visions for the new Peruvian Republic.92 They feared the re
 emergence of popular uprisings led by Indians seeking to re-establish the Incan
 empire.93 Their notions of equality and freedom, thus, ended short of reaching
 the Indians, who they considered inferior.94 Instead they contemplated a new
 republic which "would allow formerly oppressed Indians to be gradually
 'enlightened' and 'civilized' so that they could 'join the rest ofthe free citizens'
 of Peru in the semi-sacred unity ofthe independent nation of citizens."95
 Against this backdrop, revolutionary Creoles assembled in a Congress in
 Lima wrote a letter to the Indians of the Interior Provinces. Entitled, "The
 Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces," the
 letter reads:96
 90. Thurner, supra note 60, at 5 ("For Creole liberals the 'Republic' in the postcolonial
 Republic of Peru could not be the same as the 'republic9 in the colonial republic of Indians or
 republic of Spaniards.").
 91. Sarah Chambers describes the situation in Arequipa, "[T]hose Indians who participated
 in republican politics would do so primarily as individuals rather than because they were
 represented by communal authorities." Sarah Chambers, From Subjects to Citizens:
 Honor, Gender, and Politics in Arequipa, Peru, 1780-1854, at 61 (1999).
 92. Tupac Amaru, or Jos? Gabriel Condorcanqui, led the largest rebellion in Spanish
 American colonial history from 1781-83 before being captured and beheaded by the Spanish
 authorities in Cuzco. Walker, supra note 55, at 16. For more information on Tupac Amaru,
 see id. at 16-54.
 93. Thurner, supra note 60, at 4,9-10.
 94. Id. at 10 ("And for Bolivar, 'no Indian could be the bearer of a significant past or the
 spiritual leader, however fictionalized, of a republican future. For the most part Bolivar thought
 of Indians [with the exception ofthe romanticized 'untamed Araucanians' of Chile], when at
 all, as an essentially docile, unpoliticizable mass that 'wishes only for rest and solitude.'").
 95. /?/.at5.
 96. The Spanish version ofthe document reads:
 El Congreso Constituyente del Per? a los Indios de las Provincias Interiores
 Nobles hijos del sol, amados hermanos, a vosotros virtuosos indios, os
 dirigimos la palabra, y no os asombre que os llamemos, hermanos: lo somos en
 verdad, descendemos de unos mismos padres; formamos una sola familia y con
 el suelo que nos pertenece, hemos recuperado tambi?n nuestra dignidad y nuestros
 derechos. Hemos pasado m?s de trescientos a?os de esclavitud en la humillaci?n
 No. 1 ] PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 19
 m?s degradante y nuestro sufrimiento movi? al fin a nuestro Dios a que nos
 mirase con ojos de misericordia. ?1 nos inspir? el sentimiento de Libertad y el
 mismo nos ha dado fuerza para arrollar a los injustos usurpadores, que sobre
 quitarnos nuestra plata y nuestro oro, se posesionaron de nuestros pueblos, os
 impusieron tributos, nos recargaron de pensiones y nos vend?an nuestro pan y
 nuestra agua. Ya rompimos los grillos, y este prodigio es el resultado de vuestras
 l?grimas y de nuestros esfuerzos. ?1 Ejercito Libertador que os entregar? esta carta
 lo enviamos con el designio de destrozar la ?ltima argolla de la cadena que os
 oprime. Marcha a salvaros y protegeros. El os dir? y har? entender que est?n
 constituidos; que hemos formado todos los hijos de Lima, Cuzco, Arequipa,
 Trujillo, Puno, Huamanga y Huancavelica, un Congreso de los m?s honrados y
 sabios vecinos de esas mismas provincias. Este Congreso tiene la misma y aun
 mayor soberan?a que la de nuestros amados Incas. El, a nombre de todos los
 pueblos, y de vosotros mismos, va a dictar leyes que han de gobernarnos muy
 distantes de las que nos dictaron los injustos reyes de Espa?a. Vosotros indios,
 sois el primer objeto de nuestros cuidados. Nos acordamos de lo que hab?is
 padecido, y trabajamos por haceros felices en el d?a. Vais a ser nobles, instruidos,
 propietarios, y representareis entre los hombres todo lo que es debido a vuestras
 virtudes.
 Esperad muy breve el cumplimiento exacto de estas promesas que no son
 seguramente como los falsos ofrecimientos del gobierno espa?ol. Aguardad
 tambi?n nuestras frecuentes cartas, nuestras determinaciones, y nuestra
 constituci?n. Todo os ir? en vuestro idioma quechua, que nos ense?aron nuestros
 padres y que mamasteis a los pechos de vuestras tiernas madres.
 ! Hermanos!: el d?a que recib?is esta carta ver?is a vuestro padre el sol
 amanecer m?s alegre sobre la cumbre de vuestros volcanoes de Arequipa,
 Chachani, Pichupichu, Coropuna, Sulimana, Sarasara, Vilcanota, Ilimani.
 Abrazad entonces a vuestros hijos, halagad a vuestras esposas, derramad flores
 sobre las hueseras de vuestros padres, y entonad al son de vuestro tambor y
 vuestra flauta dulces yarav?es, y bailad alegres cachuas diciendo a gritos; ya
 somos nuestros; ya somos libres; ya somos felices.
 En la ciudad de Lima, a 10 de Octubre de 1822 a?os. - Javier de Luna
 Pizarro, Presidente. - Jos? S?nchez Carri?n, Diputado secretario. - Francisco
 Javier Mari?tegui, Diputado secretario.
 Translating the document into English was challenging because translating a document from
 one language into another forces the translator to reconcile differences between the two
 languages that are not easily reconcilable due to the intricacies of both languages. While
 attempting to be true to the text, the English translation loses something in the process.
 First, I had to alter slightly the verb forms to clarify direct and indirect objects. While this
 does not change the meaning ofthe text, it alters the flow slightly. The Spanish language uses
 a reflexive verb form, which indicates the addressee and does not exist in English. I have
 eliminated many of these references because the same form is not used in English (where the
 intended audience is understood) and literal translation interrupted the flow ofthe sentences.
 Similarly, due in part to the reflexive form, what is considered an unclear antecedent in English
 is often not unclear in Spanish due to verb endings which are specified and provide more
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 Noble sons ofthe sun, beloved brothers, to you virtuous Indians, we
 address the word, and do not be astonished that we call you,
 brothers: we are in truth, we descend from the same fathers; we
 form only one family and belong to the same native land, we have
 also regained our dignity and our rights. We have passed more than
 300 years of slavery in the most degrading humiliation and in the
 end our suffering moved our God to see us with eyes of mercy. He
 inspired in us the sentiment of Liberty and the same has given us the
 strength to destroy the unjust usurpers, that take from us not only
 our silver and our gold, but that also possessed our towns, imposed
 tributes, overloaded us with anxiety and sold our bread and water.
 Already we broke the fetters, and this miracle is the result of your
 tears and our courage. The Liberation Army that will deliver this
 letter that we send you with the purpose to cut to pieces the last
 information than their English counterparts, which have to be modified with details about the
 speaker, direct object, and the person addressed. In the text, this led to some places, in which
 a pronoun needed to be replaced with the specific noun in English. Accordingly, I replaced "el"
 with "the army" and "the Congress" to clarify the meaning ofthe document.
 J.B. White describes a similar difference in verb endings in his comparison of English and
 Greek. He explains,
 Every finite verb has endings that tell you whether the actor is one person or more,
 and whether the actor is the speaker, the person addressed, or a third person;
 whether the action takes place in past, present, or future time; whether it is
 continuative, punctual, or completed; whether it is a simple description of a fact
 (indicative) or expressive of hopes, fears, wishes, or commands (modal). And so
 on. None of these words can appear "bare," without any syntactic indicators, such
 as "house" or "person," say, can in English. The effect of such a structure is that
 it makes possible a different kind of sentence, and a different kind of thought,
 from anything that we do in English.
 White, supra note 43, at 75-76.
 Second, certain words were particularly difficult to translate because the English words do
 not carry the same connotation or meaning as the Spanish. Here the meaning assigned becomes
 crucial because native English speakers run the risk of interpreting words without fully
 understanding the meaning assigned to them in Spanish. White also addresses this point. He
 states, "what occasions language, what calls for speech, may not be naming of things ? we can
 point after all ? but a sense of their meaning for us." Id. at 84. I have tried to note these lapses
 in translation in the analysis ofthe text.
 Finally, in the translation of metaphors and similes, I tried to minimize the loss of meaning
 where possible. In doing this, I kept in mind the fact that the text was probably meant to be
 proclaimed rather than read silently.
 A lot more could be said about the differences between the two languages and how that
 affects translation. For a more detailed discussion of these kinds of problems, see id. at 69-103.
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 large iron ring ofthe chain that oppresses us. It marches to save and
 protect you. The army will give you and make you understand that
 it is constituted; that we, all the sons of Lima, Cuzco, Arequipa,
 Trujillo, Puno, Huamanga and Huancavelica, have formed a
 Congress ofthe most honorable and wise neighbors of these same
 provinces. This Congress has the same and even greater
 sovereignty of our beloved Incas. The Congress, in the name of all
 the communities and of your same, will dictate laws that will
 govern us very differently than those that were dictated by the
 unjust kings of Spain. You Indians are the first object of our
 attention. We agree that you have suffered and we work to make
 you happy in the day. You will be noble, well-educated, property
 owners and you will represent among men all that is owed to your
 virtues.
 Await very shortly the exact fulfillment of these promises that are
 trustworthy unlike the false offerings ofthe Spanish government.
 Await also our frequent letters, our resolutions and our constitution.
 All will be in your language quechua, that we were taught by our
 fathers and that you suckled at the breasts of your affectionate
 mothers.
 Brothers!: the day that you receive this letter you will see your
 father the sun rise very bright about the summit of your vol?anos of
 Arequipa, Chachani, Pichpichu, Coropuna, Sulimana, Sarasara,
 Vilcanota, Ilimani. Embrace your sons, praise your wives, spread
 flowers about the graves of your fathers and sing traditional songs
 of your drum and your sweet flute, and dance happy traditional
 dances exclaiming; already we are our own [men]; already we are
 free; already we are happy.
 In the city of Lima, on 10 October 1822. - Javier de Luna
 Pizarro, President. - Jos? S?nchez Carrion, Deputy secretary. -
 Francisco Javier Mariategui, Deputy secretary.97
 The immediate impact ofthe letter is difficult to determine. From its own
 internal references, it was to be delivered to the Indians in the Cuzco region and
 other highland locations. While it is not clear that the document was ever
 delivered, the childlike quality ofthe Spanish language used indicates that the
 97. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces
 (Oct. 10, 1822) (on file with author).
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 document was meant to be proclaimed orally rather than read silently.98 Most
 likely, if the document was ever proclaimed, it was read in Quechua as well as
 Spanish.99 Such governmental proclamations were common, but how the
 Indians responded to the letter is unknown. If the Indians did receive the letter,
 it did not inspire them to join the war effort. By 1822, Indians, who were as
 ambivalent about the independence movement as Creoles, were not large-scale
 participants in the War of Independence.100
 The letter has been the subject of little commentary, but it has been
 reproduced regularly and is often found in anthologies of early Peruvian
 documents and collections of Peruvian constitutions.101 Andean historians,
 legal scholars, and anthropologists are aware of its existence,102 and some
 Peruvian constitutional law scholars assert it is key to understanding Peruvian
 constitutional history.103 Its continued reproduction and mention in scholarly
 circles indicates that even though it has not been widely analyzed, it has been
 consistently recognized as part of Peruvian history and constitutionalism.
 The letter's legacy lies in that it raises issues about the political community
 that continue to pervade Peruvian constitutionalism, nationalism, and political
 society.104 Independence was a key moment in the formation ofthe Peruvian
 political community. Historian Sarah Chambers explains, "[independence
 initiated negotiations over citizenship?its respective rights and obligations as
 98. One of my Spanish colleagues, Julen Etxabe, suggested that the childlike language used
 in the document indicates that it was written to be read aloud and most likely would have been
 delivered orally. What actually happened, however, is unclear.
 99. The possible oral delivery ofthe document raises several questions and issues that will
 not be explicitly addressed here. Bruce Mannheim suggested that the translation ofthe text into
 Quechua would not have been understood by all of the indigenous peoples of the interior
 provinces because some of them would either not have spoken Quechua or not have understood
 this dialect. Interview with Bruce Mannheim, supra note 82. This may indicate that the actual
 audience was more a romanticized idea ofthe descendants ofthe Incas (who spoke Quechua)
 than the Indian population ofthe interior provinces.
 Further I have no information on who translated the document or the quality of the
 translation ofthe Spanish into Quechua. Translations of communications of contact, including
 treaties, have been known to be notoriously bad and this one could be as well.
 100. Walker, supra note 55, at 118 ("The Indian population in the Cuzco region had never
 been homogeneous, but the fragmentary application and impact of the late colonial reforms
 increased inter- and intracommunity differences, a fact that helps explain the multiplicity of
 strategies adopted during the long War of Independence.").
 101. See, e.g., COMISI?N NACIONAL DEL SESQUICENTENARIO DE LA INDEPENDENCIA DEL
 Per?, Antolog?a de la Independencia del Per? 511-12(1959).
 102. Interview with Bruce Mannheim, supra note 82.
 103. Anonymous interview, Universidad de Cat?lica, Lima, Per? (July 2002).
 104. See supra Part II.
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 well as its boundaries of inclusion and exclusion?that have remained at the
 center of political movements in Latin America... until today."105 The 1822
 letter helps us to contextualize this moment and see how it shaped Peruvian
 constitutionalism.
 Close to two centuries after the writing ofthe letter, Peru's constitution
 making and nation-making projects remain incomplete. Peruvian sociologist
 Sinesio L?pez explains, "Peru is a nation in formation. Independence did not
 resolve the national problem produced by the conquest and colonization that set
 distinct economic, cultural and racial societies against one another."106 The
 1822 letter suggests some ofthe reasons why this process remains incomplete.
 It enhances our understanding of later attempts to complete it and informs the
 formation of Peruvian nationalism and constitutionalism that continues today.
 I have represented the 1822 letter as a pre-constitutional document central
 to Peruvian constitutionalism much like the Declaration of Independence in the
 United States and yet simultaneously admitted that the impacts ofthe letter are
 unknown, at best more ambiguous than those of the Declaration, which we
 ritualistically celebrate every Fourth of July. What is it about this letter, that
 retrospectively makes it so key to Peruvian constitutionalism? A closer look
 at the letter reveals the constitutional tensions that it identified and that have
 remained unresolved in the present.
 1. To Whom, From Whom, For What: Constituting A Community
 The document is a letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the
 Indians ofthe Interior Provinces seeking to identify the Indians with the cause
 ofthat revolutionary constitution-making body. It commences:
 Noble sons ofthe sun, beloved brothers, to you virtuous Indians, we
 address the word, and do not be astonished that we call you,
 brothers: we are in truth, we descend from the same fathers; we
 form only one family and belong to the same native land, we have
 regained also our dignity and our rights.107
 105. Chambers, supra note 91, at 3.
 106. Sinesio L?pez, De Imperio a Nacionalidades Oprimadas: Notas Sobre el Problema
 Nacional Ind?gena, in NUEVA HISTORIA GENERAL DEL PER?: UN COMPENDIO 231(1979) ("El
 Per? es una naci?n en formaci?n. La independencia no pudo resolver el problema national
 producido por la conquista y la colonia que contrapusieron los sociedades distinctas econ?mica,
 cultural y racialmente."). Translation in text by author.
 107. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97.
 24  AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
 This introduces not just a letter, but a very personal and informal one. It
 explicitly addresses "brothers" and constructs an imagined familial relationship
 between the writer and the recipient Indians. It is as though the author is
 speaking to a community that already exists ? the family as community ?
 rather than creating one.108 The document, thus, constitutes a community by
 pretending like it is not creating one. It appeals to a sense of nation based on
 the common birth of Creoles and Indians in Peru and their universal tie to a
 native homeland. Yet simultaneously the document acknowledges the Indians
 as separate from the Creoles by recognizing that they are the "sons ofthe sun"
 and the direct descendants ofthe Incas.109 In an odd turn, the letter almost
 breaks its imagined community with this reference to outside, uncommon ties.
 Even with the hint of a break here, the text does not abandon its initial focus
 on creating a unified community through a close familial relationship between
 Creoles in Lima and Indians in the highlands, but reaffirms the close
 relationship between the two groups through an appeal to shared experiences.
 The letter states,
 We have passed more than 300 years of slavery in the most
 degrading humiliation and in the end our suffering moved our God
 to see us with eyes of mercy. He inspired in us the sentiment of
 Liberty and the same has given us the strength to destroy the unjust
 usurpers, that take from us not only our silver and our gold, but also
 that possessed our towns, imposed tributes, overloaded us with
 anxiety and sold our bread and water.110
 By appealing to a shared experience, namely the fate they both suffered
 under Spanish rule, the text reinforces the idea of a unified community that is
 inclusive of both the writer and the recipient. Similarly, in very clear ways, the
 text distinguishes itself from previous documents of the viceroyalty. For
 instance, the text identifies the Indians in a familiar, similar way rather than
 108. In Spanish, the text enhances the idea ofthe personal and familiar through the use of
 the "vosotros" form, which is the form for the informal plural you, instead ofthe more formal
 "ustedes" form. American Heritage Spanish Dictionary xiv, ? G33 (1986).
 109. Calling the Indians "sons ofthe sun" acknowledges the spiritual link between the
 Incans and the sun. Arguably, this phraseology recognizes and honors the link between the
 Indians and the Incans and can be interpreted as an accolade to the Indians. A more cynical
 reading, however, may suggest that the Creoles intended to claim descendency from the Incans
 themselves as a way to justify their own sovereignty from Spain.
 110. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97.
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 subjecting them to tributes, taxes, and indentured servitude ? all of which
 were common hallmarks ofthe Spanish viceroyalty.111 The letter pursues this
 desire to create a unified community in its appeal to the sovereignty of the
 Incas, its inclusive description ofthe Constitutional Congress, and its use ofthe
 geography ofthe Andes.112
 2. Shapeshifting to Obscure an Ambiguous Universe113
 This initial interpretation of the document as a letter written by Creole
 revolutionaries to highland Indians to create a unified community involved in
 the making of a new constitution and nation presents one way of understanding
 how the letter imagines its own project. This interpretation, however,
 oversimplifies both the intricacies ofthe document and the complexities ofthe
 time in which it was written. It overlooks an important ambiguity in how the
 text describes its project and the surrounding universe. A closer look at how
 the letter represents the legal, political, social and cultural universe indicates
 how the notion of a familial relationship and a commonality of experience
 between Creoles and Indians contradicts other references made in the text about
 Indians.
 The focus in the document shifts about halfway through the first paragraph
 when a distinction (arguably foreshadowed in the first sentence, which
 identifies the Indians with the Incas by calling them "sons ofthe sun") between
 Indians and Creoles emerges. The text submerges this move through the dual
 use ofthe word "we" within the first paragraph and hides it from the reader,
 leaving the original fiction of a unified community. Only close attention and
 111. Lynch, supra note 59, at 164.
 112. Interestingly enough, the regions mentioned extend beyond the state of Peru today and
 into present-day Bolivia by referring to Ilimani, which is the main Andean peak towering above
 La Paz, Bolivia.
 113. Many native Indian tribes in North America speak of a concept of shapeshifting and
 shapeshifters or tricksters. See, e.g., American Indian Trickster Tales (Richard Erdoes &
 Alfonso Ortiz eds., 1998). Shapeshifters or tricksters are often not what they seem. Gerald
 Vizenor, Trickster Discourse: Comic Holotropes and Language Games, /?NARRATIVE CHANCE
 Postmodern Discourse on Native American Literatures 187-208(1989). For example,
 the coyote is often characterized as the most famous ofthe shapeshifters because of his ability
 to shift deceptively from one form of being, such as coyote to another, such as raven or human,
 and then back to his original form. Often the shapeshift occurs so quickly that it is
 unidentifiable to human senses of perception. I use this concept here because it describes a
 transition in identity that can also be applied to a series of transitions in the text, which seek to
 obscure the identity of and relationship between the speaker and the audience. For other
 references to the idea ofthe shapeshifting in legal language, see John Borrows, Frozen Rights
 in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the Trickster, 22 Am. INDIAN L. Rev. 37 (1997).
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 an attentive ear would have picked up on the shift and it may have been
 intentionally manufactured to brush over an imperfection in the imagined
 community that the text tries to create.114
 The shift occurs when the "we" changes from being "we" the Indians and
 Creoles to being "we" the Creoles. The move suggests that a "you" and an
 "us" exists within the universal "we" that the document initially attempts to
 create. The move changes quickly to blur the result.115 Subtly, this shift
 emerges in the following sentence:
 Already we broke the fetters, and this miracle is the result of your
 tears and our courage.116
 Here, the "we" no longer refers to Indians and Creoles as a unified
 community, but only to the Creoles, who responded with "their" courage to the
 tears ofthe Indians. The change is more accentuated in the next sentence:
 The Liberation Army that will deliver this letter that we send you
 with the purpose to cut to pieces the last large iron ring ofthe chain
 that oppresses us.117
 Again, the implied "we" ofthe text exists as exclusive rather than inclusive
 ofthe recipient "you" ofthe letter. The "we" is then clarified as the Liberation
 Army sent by the Constitutional Congress. And yet the same sentence ends
 with a return to the original claimed community by implying the Spanish
 oppresses both of "us."
 With the recognition ofthe Liberation Army as the deliverers ofthe letter,
 the initial fiction of a unified community of Indians and revolutionaries breaks
 down despite the struggle to retain the fiction through the use of "us" at the end
 ofthe sentence. This breakdown was inevitable given the social relations at the
 time ofthe revolution. As already mentioned, historians have long documented
 the fragmentation ofthe Peruvian population during the revolution.m Rejected
 by the Spaniards for being born in America, the revolutionaries faced internal
 114. I wonder if this subtle shift exists in the Quechua translation and could have been
 identified at delivery.
 115. This shift works more magically in Spanish, which due to specified verb endings is less
 pronoun reliant than English. See supra note 96. In Spanish, the shift is hidden in the verb
 ending, which makes it less obvious than the change in pronouns evident in the English
 translation.
 116. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97.
 117. Id.
 118. See, e.g., LYNCH, supra note 59, at 157.
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 anguish over their status as "Americans" rather than Europeans or Spaniards.119
 Consequently, this increased the tension in their relationship with the Indians. 12?
 Historian Mark Thurner explains
 Indeed, the Creole nationalist identification with America presented
 inevitable and transparent contradictions ? of which Bolivar
 himself was well aware ? given the historically deeper claims to
 native status made by rival Andean or Indian elites and their
 communities. As Bolivar confessed:
 "Americans by birth and Europeans by law, we [Creoles] find
 ourselves engaged in a dual conflict, disputing with natives for titles
 of ownership, and at the same time struggling to maintain ourselves
 in the country of our birth against the opposition ofthe [Spanish]
 invaders. Thus our position is most extraordinary and
 complicated."121
 A deep geographical divide fragmented revolutionary Peru just as much as
 social and linguistic differences.122 Concentrated in Lima with a small
 population in Cuzco, the Creoles remained alienated geographically as well as
 socially and linguistically from the Indians (and the Spanish).
 Due to the social, cultural, and geographical stratification in revolutionary
 Peru, the Creoles, with only a minority ofthe population, were stuck between
 a rock, the Spanish Empire, and a hard place, native Peru. The letter appears
 to be an attempt to resolve the Creoles' predicament through a negotiated
 alliance with the Indians. To use a contract metaphor, the letter appears to be
 an offer to the Indians to join the Creoles.123 At the same time, it is only the
 beginning of negotiations over the new Peruvian state and it is not clear that the
 Creoles were committed to negotiating with and including the Indians. While
 the letter hints at inclusion and a more equal partnership between Creoles and
 Indians, the letter does not clearly express what the Indians would receive in
 exchange for allying with the Creoles against the Spanish.
 A shift in tone follows the change in who is identified by the text as
 constituting the "we" in the letter and provides some clues as to why Creoles
 wrote the letter. The tone transitions from declaratory to persuasive; it
 encourages the Indians to join the Creoles in their military and constitutional
 119. Thurner, supra note 60, at 4.
 120. Id.
 121. Id.
 122. See supra text accompanying note 88.
 123. Thanks to Craig Lawler for suggesting the contract metaphor.
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 pursuits rather than acknowledges a pre-existing community between the two.
 The next sentence provides Indians with reasons for joining the revolutionaries:
 The army will give you and make you understand that it is
 constituted; that we, all the sons of Lima, Cuzco, Arequipa, Trujillo,
 Puno, Huamanga and Huancavelica, have formed a Congress ofthe
 most honorable and wise neighbors of these same provinces.124
 Not only does the ambiguity between "we" as including Creoles and Indians
 and "we" as just Creoles persist, but the tone shifts to a paternalistic concern for
 the Indians. The Spanish version expresses a strong sense of paternalism in the
 sentence and it loses some of its meaning in the English translation. The terms
 translated here as "honorable" and "wise," imply a lower social status not
 apparent in English.125 The use of these terms indicates that the speaker is
 talking down as though this social division were the natural state ofthe world.
 The paternalism increases in the next couple of sentences. Consider the
 following:
 The Congress, in the name of all the communities and of your same,
 goes to dictate laws that will govern us very differently than those
 that were dictated by the unjust kings of Spain. You Indians, are the
 first object of our attention. We agree that you have suffered and
 we work to make you happy in the day. You will be noble, well
 educated, property owners and you will represent among men all
 that is owed to your virtues.126
 It is as though the promise of a paternalistic relationship was the only way
 Indians could be persuaded either to join or at least not to oppose the Creoles.
 Notice that the Constitutional Congress, which seeks to represent the Indians'
 124. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97.
 125. The Spanish "sabios" and "honrado" translate loosely into wise and honorable, but both
 indicate a status that is not attributed to their English counterparts. Whereas, "sabios" suggests
 a kind of wisdom acquired later in life, such as that of an elder in the community, wise has a
 broader application in English. My understanding of "sabios" is that it suggests a kind of
 wisdom attributable to someone who has seen much of life. Examples of who has "sabios"
 would include a grandfather figure, such as father time, or a distinguished elder in a native
 community. Similarly, "honrado" goes to a kind of honesty or integrity possessed by a good
 person of a lower social status in Spanish, which is not part ofthe meaning of honorable, the
 English word I have chosen. Thanks to Julen Etxabe for helping to clarify the distinctions
 between the Spanish meanings and their English translations.
 126. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97.
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 interests and make them "happy in the day," does not contain representatives
 of the Indians. Rather, the "Indians are the first object" of the Creoles'
 attention and the Creoles promise a better (if not more representative) regime
 than the tyranny ofthe Spanish. This weak promise does not guarantee that the
 Creoles would actually replace the Spanish with something better and leaves
 open the possibility of a new Creole regime that was equally bad if not worse
 for Indians. The Creoles' paternalistic instruction to the Indians that they will
 be "noble" and "well-educated" suggests that they attributed to the Indians the
 same lowly status as did the Spanish.
 With this paternalistic instruction, another contradiction (or perhaps another
 manifestation ofthe same contradiction) emerges. Despite the description of
 Indians as noble in the first sentence ofthe document, the instruction "to be
 noble" suggests otherwise. Why will the Indians be noble if they are noble
 already? This paternalism appears to undercut the fiction of a unified
 community of Indians and Creoles and serves as another example ofthe larger
 tension in the text about the relationship between them. It also arguably
 undermines the earlier implied argument by Creoles that the Indians should join
 them because they were all part ofthe same community with the same family,
 experiences, and rights. The extension of paternalism here suggests that this
 first argument may have been a pre-text to garner Indian support.
 The paternalism suggests that social stratifications will remain even after the
 Spanish are gone and that inequalities between communities will continue.
 This undercuts the Creole promise of a new constitutional order based on
 equality and protective of the Indians.127 Paternalism returns in the next
 paragraph when the Creoles instruct the Indians:
 Await very shortly the exact fulfillment of these promises that are
 trustworthy unlike the false offerings ofthe Spanish government.
 Await also our frequent letters, our resolutions and our
 constitution.128
 This "await for our resolutions and our constitution" is followed by a
 promise, in the form of an emotional statement about mothers and fathers, to
 demonstrate the good intentions ofthe Creoles, and reiterate the original fiction
 of a unified community between Creoles and Indians.
 127. Thurner suggests that status distinctions not only remained after the creation ofthe
 Republic, but in some ways worsened. Thurner, supra note 60, at 137.
 128. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97.
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 All will be in your language quechua, that we were taught by our
 fathers and that you suckled at the breasts of your affectionate
 mothers.129
 Although the promise here is clear, we will include you in our constitution
 and our nation through the use of your language, the rest ofthe sentence is an
 enigma, perhaps reflective ofthe larger ambiguity in the document about the
 relationship between Indians and Creoles. The sentence obscures what the
 constitutional relationship between the two will be. The changes in tone and
 in the definition of the community shift so rapidly and so often (sometimes
 even within the same sentence) that it is hard to tell. The ambiguity and the
 tension between indigenous and Creoles that it produces are the most important
 and persistent message in the text.
 3. Looking for Legitimacy Between a Rock and a Hard Place
 If indeed the Creoles were between a rock and hard place, with the rock
 being the Spanish Viceroyalty and the hard place being the Indians, why try to
 resolve it by writing a letter to the Indians? Simply, the Indians could
 numerically assist in the defeat ofthe Spanish. But the Creoles seem somewhat
 uncomfortable, or at the very least ambiguous about such an alliance, and
 uncertain, if not outright squeamish, about allowing any participation by
 Indians in the new constitutional regime. If they did not want the Indians to
 join them (at least not in the governing aspects ofthe new regime), what did the
 Creoles want? This communication was written during the revolutionary war,
 four years before the liberation of Peru was complete, and one year before the
 enactment of Peru's first constitution.130
 The interpretation of one tricky sentence, slid sneakily between the
 monotonous but puzzling ambiguity of the persuasive language and the
 paternalistic cares in the first paragraph is central to investigating the letter:
 This Congress has the same and even greater sovereignty of our beloved Incas.
 Wait a minute ? sovereignty? What has that got to do with anything? Why
 appeal to Incan sovereignty?
 Perhaps sovereignty has everything to do with it. After all, European
 nations, including the Spanish, used their colonies in the Americas as a way to
 solidify their own sovereignty.131 The Spanish had to subjugate the powerful
 129. Id.
 130. Id. at 187.
 131. See generally JENS BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNTY (1995); PATRICIA
 Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640
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 Incan Empire, which stretched from Colombia to Chile, before laying claim to
 Peru. When the letter was written, the Creoles were trying to solidify their own
 sovereignty claims. They had already convened a Constitutional Congress;
 they were in the process of creating a new nation-state and would issue their
 first formal constitution within a year. They appeared to be trying to legitimize
 their new regime by appealing to their status as native-born Americans and
 thus, by association, descendants of a greater Incan sovereignty. The Creoles
 may have been trying to include the Indians via an appeal to Incan sovereignty.
 In a swift rhetorical move, they disguised the fact that they had no other claim
 to legitimacy. (Even though they had declared independence,) They had not
 won the war with Spain. Note, however, that even here Creoles revolutionaries
 could not resolve their ambiguous relationship with the Indians; they
 recognized the sovereignty ofthe Incas, not the sovereignty ofthe Indians. In
 doing this, they romanticized the fallen Incan empire, the deceased glory rather
 than the less impressive present status of the subjugated Indians. And this
 could be how they managed to claim sovereignty for themselves ? they were
 not usurping the sovereignty ofthe current Indians, but appealing to an older
 one, which they as natives to America also inherited.132
 Thurner identifies the Creoles' technique: "When Peruvian Creoles did turn
 their imaginative attention to the Andean heritage (which was rare), they
 routinely juxtaposed the once great but ostensibly vanished civilization ofthe
 Inka against the degenerate and inferior 'Indian race' that surrounded them."133
 The juxtaposition between Incas and Indians provided the Creoles with a way
 to navigate between the rock and the hard place. The Creoles appealed to the
 nostalgia ofthe once-great but now subjugated past which provided distance
 from the Spanish and legitimized the claimed sovereignty of a new,
 independent Peruvian state, but did not fully alienate or include the Indians.
 4. Full Circle
 The final paragraph in the letter loops back to the original praise given to the
 Indians by the Creoles in a typical rhetorical turn (in English at least). In the
 end, the document comes full circle, returning to the tone of admiration for
 Indians and the creation of a unified community between Indians and Creoles
 upon which a new, independent constitutional Peruvian nation could be built.
 (1995).
 132. A similar move is also occasionally made in United States' literature about Native
 Americans. The author uses the idea of "dead" or historicized Indians to make a claim for an
 inheritance from them. See, e.g., Willa Cather, The Professor's House (1925).
 133. Thurner, supra note 60, at 10.
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 Almost predictably the last paragraph repeats the same call to brotherhood that
 commences the letter as a whole:
 Brothers!: the day that you receive this letter you will see your
 father the sun rise very bright about the summit of your vol?anos of
 Arequipa, Chachani, Pichpichu, Coropuna, Sulimana, Sarasara,
 Vilcanota, Ilimani. Embrace your sons, praise your wives, spread
 flowers about the graves of your fathers and sing traditional songs
 of your drum and your sweet flute, and dance happy traditional
 dances exclaiming; already we are our own [men]; already we are
 free; already we are happy.134
 The Creoles returned to the tone abandoned in the middle of the document.
 They wished to leave the Indians not with the divisive paternalism central to the
 heart ofthe document but with a sense of unity.
 The text has a strategy to it: start with flowery language and an admiring
 tone about the connection between the Indians and the author, break ?
 inconsistently ? somewhere in the middle from this tone and take up a more
 paternalistic and authoritarian one, then return to the original niceties at the
 end.135 The text here aspires to create an imagined community between Creoles
 and Indians that it abandons halfway through the document and then returns to
 in the end. This completion ofthe circle, by beginning and ending on the same
 note, submerges the shifts within the document even more than the initial,
 inconsistent shifts themselves. The Creoles appear to have taken the advice
 about beginning and ending with what you want your audience to remember
 because they replicate it here by reiterating that the Indians are their brothers
 and suggesting that the new Republic will bring the light of a new, happier day
 to the Indians.
 Although such a strategy demonstrates how the authors may have used the
 ambiguity of their relationship with the Indians to develop the arguments they
 make in the document and encourage (or manipulate) Indians to act in certain
 134. Letter from the Constitutional Congress of Peru to the Indians ofthe Interior Provinces,
 supra note 97. My translation ofthe metaphor "a vuestro padre el sol amanecer mas alegre
 sobre la cumbre" clearly loses some ofthe original meaning, which suggests that a new day is
 rising for the Indians upon the receipt of the letter. To translate the metaphor to ensure this
 meaning would obscure another important meaning in the sentence, namely that ofthe sun as
 the father ofthe Incas and the link to indigenous Andean religion. Because ofthe focus on the
 relationship between indigenous peoples and the author ofthe text, I choose to obscure the first
 meaning about a new day rising in order to emphasize the connection between the Incas and the
 sun god.
 135. Thanks to Carsten Hoppe for suggesting this "strategy."
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 ways, the strategy does not resolve any of the underlying tensions in the
 document. The indeterminate relationship between Indians and Creoles
 remains and I am left with the same question I started with: Are the Indians
 part ofthe political community, constitution, and nation ofthe new Republic,
 as defined in this document, or not?
 This lingering question nicely expresses the constitutional tension between
 indigenous peoples and Creoles identified by the 1822 letter at the time of
 constitution-making. It suggests the text's underlying struggles to coherently
 imagine its own constitutional project, to create a unified community in a new
 Peruvian Republic, and to legitimate its own sovereign authority amidst a
 revolutionary war. The Creoles' ambiguity towards indigenous peoples reflects
 the contradictory ways in which they perceived their legal, political, social and
 cultural universe. This tension between indigenous peoples and Creoles, first
 identified at the moment of constitutional origin, remains unresolved in
 Peruvian constitutionalism today.
 B. A Relic 's Contemporary Relevance: How the 1822 Letter Informs
 Constitutional Politics Today
 In this part, I survey Peruvian constitutional documents to demonstrate how
 the tension in the 1822 letter about the constitutional status of indigenous
 peoples continually reemerges in Peruvian constitutional discourses. This brief
 history of Peruvian constitutional politics situates the 1822 letter at the moment
 of constitutional origin and compares it to later constitutional politics. This
 contextualization illustrates how the dialogue about the inclusion of Indians in
 the 1822 letter has persisted.136 The tension in the 1822 letter has resurfaced
 regularly throughout Peruvian constitutional history and it prompted later
 constitutional debates over the relationship between indigenous peoples and
 Creoles. While tensions in the 1822 letter largely frame the discourse, the
 contours ofthe debate shifted as responses to the tension changed. I focus on
 substantive provisions of Peruvian constitutions to illustrate how the tension
 identified in the 1822 letter has shaped Peruvian constitutional politics
 historically. These constitutional provisions are informative because Creoles
 136. This article does not comprehensively review the historical sources and does not aim
 to resolve any historical issues. My focus is more illustrative: to show a brief historical
 description ofthe nation as defined by political elites through constitutional provisions. I do
 not consider how indigenous peoples perceived themselves within the new Republic but rather
 look at official statements issued by Creole governments in constitutions. For information on
 how indigenous peoples contested the notions of citizenship embodied by the new nation, see
 Thurner, supra note 60; Chambers, supra note 91; Walker, supra note 55.
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 often used constitutions to help define and consolidate the nation.137 These
 substantive constitutional provisions document how the debate has developed
 over time and how Peruvian constitution-makers continue to respond to the
 tensions in the 1822 letter. The interchange between texts illustrates the
 persistence ofthe original tension and how it continues to shape the state's
 relationship with indigenous peoples. The highlighting of the origin and
 persistence of this tension facilitates a more complete understanding of Peru's
 longstanding constitutional ambivalence towards indigenous peoples.
 1. Persistent Problems: The Ambiguous Constitutional Status of
 Indigenous Peoples in Nineteenth Century Peru
 Early Peruvian constitutions indicate that the Creoles' hesitancy towards
 Indians continued in the formative years ofthe new republic.138 A comparison
 of early Peruvian constitutional provisions on citizenship and nationality
 demonstrates that the question was not only whether to include Indians but how
 to include them. The 1822 letter half-heartedly invited the Indians to join the
 new community to be solidified by Peruvian independence and
 constitutionalism.139 The letter, however, fell short of these promises by failing
 137. The role that constitutions played in the Creoles' nation-making project emerges in the
 texts that they created and the language that they used to address who would and would not be
 included as citizens and voters in the new nation. They used constitutions to unify the nation
 through elaborate ceremonies and dissemination ofthe document. Chambers, supra note 91,
 at 181 ("The elaborate ceremonies that had earlier reinforced allegiance to the monarch served
 after independence to legitimate the constitution."). Early constitutions were proclaimed by
 criers in the main plazas of towns so that the crowd could learn that they (or more accurately,
 some of them) would now be citizens with new rights. Id. Newspapers published the
 constitutions as well so that they could be read and discussed by the masses. Id. The Creoles
 spread the news about new constitutions and used them to inform the masses about the liberty
 and equality central to their vision for the new republic. In this way, constitutions contributed
 to the creation ofthe Peruvian nation.
 138. Although I argue that constitution-making processes often exist alongside and facilitate
 nation-making, this article will focus on the actual texts of constitutions rather than the
 constitution-making process. This focus is informed by the history of constitution-making in
 Peru, which for the most part has been non-democratic.
 139. Sinesio L?pez Jim?nez documents the tension faced by Peruvian political elites after
 independence. He contends that initially they considered indigenous peoples worthy of
 inclusion in the nation. Sinesio L?pez Jim?nez, Ciudadanos Reales e Imaginarios:
 Concepciones, Desarrollo y Mapas de la Ciudadan?a en el Per? 215 (1997) ("En un
 primer momento, los criollos y mestizos que conquistaron la independencia y que a?n sent?an
 los rescoldos dea la guerra decidieron que los indios era 'nuestros compatriotas y hermanos' y
 que como tales formaban parte de la naci?n peruana."). He notes that this moment, however,
 soon passed. Id.
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 to provide any details about how Indians would be included in the new
 republic. The letter expressed concern for the Indians but did not extend
 representation to them. Throughout the early constitutions, Creoles responded
 to the 1822 letter's indeterminacy by struggling with their own desires to
 include Indians symbolically in the nation but exclude them from any
 meaningful participation in the political community.140
 The first Peruvian constitution, written in 1823, reflected the tension in the
 1822 letter by reinforcing the indeterminate place of Indians in the political
 community.141 It serves as a good template to compare to the 1822 letter and
 other nineteenth century Peruvian constitutions because many of its articles are
 similar to those in later constitutions and the differences between constitutional
 articles can be easily noted.
 The 1823 Constitution demonstrates how Creoles continued to be torn
 between their ideals of equality and their fears of Indian insurgency. They
 dealt with this tension by distinguishing between Peruvian nationality and
 citizenship. The 1823 Constitution emphasized Peruvian nationalism by
 closely linking it to Peruvian sovereignty, which was characterized as residing
 in the nation.142 It defined the nation broadly by extending Peruvian
 "nationality" to anyone born in Peru to a mother or father who was Peruvian
 and to those who were naturalized as Peruvian.143 The responsibility ofthe
 nation was to protect individual rights,144 but these rights were guaranteed only
 to citizens and not to nationals. Citizenship was a more limited and restricted
 class than nationality.145 To qualify for citizenship, an individual had to be
 Peruvian, married or over 25 years of age, literate, and either to have a
 140. Creole fears of Indian insurrection were key to the hesitancy expressed in these early
 constitutional documents.
 141. Prior to the promulgation ofthe 1823 Constitution, the constitutional congress produced
 an interim document called "Bases de la Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana" almost
 a year earlier in December 1822. This earlier document asserts the independence of Peru from
 the Spanish monarchy and sketches the bare outlines of a constitutional structure for the new
 state. Antecedentes, Bases de la Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana (Dec. 16,1822),
 at http://www.constperu.cjb.net (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
 142. La Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana, Sancionada por el Primer Congreso
 Constituyente el 12 de Noviembre 1823, art. 3, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/
 constitu/consl823.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) ("La soberan?a reside esencialmente en la
 Naci?n").
 143. Id. at art. 10.
 144. Id. at arts. 4-5.
 145. Thurner, supra note 60, at 24 (explaining that the term used in the constitution for a
 national, "peruano," referred to an Indian commoner rather than a citizen).
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 profession or to own property.146 Citizenship could be suspended for criminal
 prosecution, scandalous behavior, or lack of employment.147
 This definition of citizenship separated the Creole republic from its colonial
 past by negating the dualism of the Spanish Monarchy and by allowing any
 individual who could meet these requirements ? regardless of race or
 ethnicity?to be a citizen. It further rejected the Spanish model by extending
 the same rights to all citizens equally.148 While it rescinded the dualism of
 Spanish rule, it created its own social stratifications based on the new
 categories of class, literacy, and age (which often served as proxies for race).
 Through this new system of social stratification, the Constitution created a civic
 model of liberal nationhood based on equality among citizens but limited these
 rights to responsible individuals who could meet the strict criteria for
 citizenship.149
 The Constitution retained the 1822 letter's ambiguous position towards
 Indians by formally but unrealistically providing them with the opportunity to
 qualify for citizenship. While Indians could technically be part ofthe "nation"
 by meeting the qualifications for nationality and were considered Peruvian,
 most had no more participation in the new republic than they had had in the
 previous Spanish Monarchy because they could not meet the requirements for
 citizenship. 15? Instead Indians lost any special status or collective rights granted
 to them by the Spanish viceroyalty for the opportunity ? as remote as it
 was ? to join the new egalitarian Peruvian republic as individuals.151 The
 reality that few Indians would qualify for citizenship demonstrates how Creoles
 146. La Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana, Sancionada por el Primer Congreso
 Constituyente el 12 de Noviembre 1823, supra note 142, at art. 17.
 147. Chambers, supra note 91, at 190.
 148. La Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana, Sancionada por el Primer Congreso
 Constituyente el 12 de Noviembre 1823, supra note 142, at art. 23, art. 193, ? 9; Thurner,
 supra note 60, at 16-17 ("[T]he Creole citizenmaking project which renamed 'Indians' as
 'Peruvians' logically implied the negation or displacement ofthe separate derechos, or colonial
 'privileges,' and status derived from membership in the colonial Indian republic, in favor ofthe
 unitary civic model of liberal nationhood under the Peruvian Republic").
 149. Chambers, supra note 91, at 190.
 150. Thurner presents a compelling story of how Indians viewed the new Peruvian republic
 and participated in their own ways. Thurner, supra note 60. While I agree with his analysis,
 my focus here is on the place (or lack thereof) that the Creoles envisioned for Indians.
 151. The 1823 Constitution foreshadowed the Indians' loss of the jurisdictional and
 communal land rights they had under Spanish rule. In 1824, Indian lands were parceled into
 individual private property and a year later, traditional Indian authorities ceased to be officially
 recognized by the government. Id. at 24-25. While disempowering Indian communities, the
 new republic sought to exert direct jurisdiction over them. Id. at 24.
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 attempted to reconcile their liberal aspirations with their fears of Indian revolt
 and shows their anxiety over the prospect of creating a nation truly inclusive
 of Indians. Rather than resolving the tension in the 1822 letter, the 1823
 Constitution recreated it by distinguishing between citizens with rights and
 nationals without rights.
 The tension that surfaced in 1822 letter and 1823 Constitution would persist
 in later nineteenth century constitutions. New responses to the tension were
 crafted through changes in the citizenship provisions in the 1826 and 1828
 Constitutions. These alterations indicate that the constitutional discourse on
 inclusion and exclusion continued.152 While the changes reflect new attempts
 by the Creoles to respond to the initial tension in the 1822 letter, they did more
 to reinforce the indeterminate constitutional status of indigenous peoples than
 to resolve it. The 1826 Constitution adopted almost the same language as the
 1823 Constitution,153 but defined the nation as inclusive of all Peruvians.154 It
 retained the same criteria for citizenship,155 but included a new article, Article
 16, which expanded citizenship to include the citizens ofthe Spanish American
 nations prior to the revolution.156 Thus, the 1826 Constitution merely reiterated
 the tension in the 1822 letter and 1823 Constitution.
 152. The 1826 Constitution is the only Peruvian constitution not to have been approved by
 either a constitutional congress or constitutional assembly. Domingo Garcia Belaunde, La
 Nueva Constituci?n del Per?: Poder Judicial y Garant?as Constitucionales, in Desaf?os
 Constitutionales Comtemporaneos 35 (C?sar Landa & Julio Fa?ndez eds., 1996). The
 1826 Constitution asserts the nation's independence, Constituci?n Pol?tica Para la Rep?blica
 Peruana 1826, art. 2, ?t/http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/consl 826.pdf (last
 visited Oct. 10, 2005) ("El Per? es, y ser? para siempre, independiente de toda dominaci?n
 extranjera"), explains that sovereignty emanates from the people, id. at art. 8 ("La soberan?a
 emana del pueblo"), and ensures equality under the law for all citizens (although slightly less
 emphatically than the earlier 1823 constitution), id. at art. 142 ("La libertad civil, la seguridad
 individual, la propiedad y la igualdad ante la ley, se garantizan a los ciudadanos por la
 Constituci?n.").
 153. Id at art. 11.
 154. Id. at art. 1 ("La Naci?n Peruana es la reuni?n de todos los peruanos."). In contrast the
 1823 Constitution defined the Peruvian Nation as a union ofthe provinces. La Constituci?n
 Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana, Sancionada por el Primer Congreso Constituyente el 12 de
 Noviembre 1823, supra note 142, at art. 1.
 155. Constituci?n Pol?tica Para la Rep?blica Peruana 1826, art. 14, at http://www.congreso.
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/consl 826.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("Para ser ciudadano
 es necesario: 1.- Ser peruano. 2.- Ser casado, o mayor de veinticinco a?os. 3.- Saber leer y
 escritir. 4.- alg?n empleo o industria; o profesar alguna ciencia o arte, sin sujeci?n a otro en
 clase de sirviente dom?stico.").
 156. Id. at art. 16 ("Los ciudadanos de las naciones de Am?rica antes espa?ola, gozar?n de
 los derechos de ciudadan?a el Per?, seg?n los tratados que se celebren con ellas.").
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 The 1828 Constitution leaned towards a more inclusive approach to
 citizenship and nationality. The 1828 Constitution closed the gap between
 citizenship and nationality by ceasing to define the nation in terms of who was
 a Peruvian157 and by expanding Peruvian citizenship through the removal ofthe
 literacy, age, and property or profession requirements.158 Simultaneously, it
 expressly limited citizenship to men, and retained all ofthe earlier grounds for
 suspension and revocation of citizenship.159 For the first time, Peru removed
 limitations on citizenship, and male Indians, at least formally under the
 Constitution, could be Peruvian citizens. This shift in the definition of
 citizenship indicates that discussions and negotiations over who belonged to the
 citizenry and within the constitutional community continued.
 For a few years, the constitutional definitions of citizenship and nationality
 gained some stability. The broad definition of citizenship in the 1828
 Constitution survived constitutional changes in 1834. The new 1834
 Constitution abandoned the earlier emphasis on nationalism, independence, and
 equality under the law by removing its earlier rhetoric defining and constituting
 the nation.160 Aside from defining the citizenry, it barely mentioned issues of
 citizenship and nationality. It simply retained the restrictions on citizenship
 established in the 1823 Constitution.
 Early Peruvian constitutions suggest that Creoles struggled throughout the
 first decade after independence to respond to the tension in the 1822 letter and
 to reconcile their liberal democratic aspirations with their fears of Indian
 insurrections. Throughout the decade, their continual attempts to address this
 tension regularly changed with constitutional definitions of nationals and
 citizens. This constant change in definitions solidified a constitutional dialogue
 ambivalent about the place of Indians in the new republic started by the 1822
 157. The 1828 Constitution continued to assert the independence ofthe Peruvian nation,
 Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1828, art. 2, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/
 ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1828.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("La Naci?n Peruana es para
 siempre libre e independiente de toda potencia extranjera. No ser? jam?s patrimonio de persona
 o familia alguna; ni admitir? con otro Estado uni?n o federaci?n que se oponga a su
 independencia."), to define the nation as composed of its citizens, id. at art. 1 ("La Naci?n
 Peruana es la asociaci?n pol?tica de todos los ciudadanos del Per?."), and to protect equality
 under the law. Id. at art. 149 ("La Constituci?n garantiza la libertad civil, la seguridad
 individual, la igualdad ante la ley, y la propiedad de los ciudadanos en la forma que sigue."),
 id. at art. 157 ("Todos los peruanos son iguales ante la ley, ya premie, ya castigue.").
 158. Id. at art. 4.
 159. Id. at arts. 5-6.
 160. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1834, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/
 ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1834.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
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 letter. By the mid-1830s, the debate stabilized temporarily as Creole
 constitutionalism limited the place and participation of Indians within the
 Peruvian nation by enacting stringent criteria for citizenship. This strategy of
 exclusion through citizenship allowed Creole constitution-makers implicitly to
 exclude Indians while retaining an appearance of equality among men.
 A crisis in Peruvian constitutionalism emerged in 1836 and the tension in the
 1822 letter emerged as central to it. Creole nationalists faced a new threat to
 their vision of an exclusive Republican Peru with the arrival of Bolivian
 Marshall Andres Santa Cruz, and his dream of a unified Peruvian-Bolivian
 Confederation.161 Santa Cruz's project reopened the debate over the definition
 ofthe Peruvian political community by suggesting an alternative vision ofthe
 nation based on a political and economic alliance between Bolivia and Peru.162
 His vision directly challenged the constitutional project being developed by
 Creole elites. His adversaries used the opportunity to solidify their own
 conception ofthe nation as exclusive of Indian citizenship.163 They exploited
 the tension between indigenous peoples and Creoles identified in the 1822
 letter by characterizing Santa Cruz negatively as a foreigner and an Indian
 rather than a Peruvian. Using such rhetoric, Creole elites defeated his dream
 of a unified Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation.164
 161. Cecilia M?ndez G., Incas Si, Indios No: Notes on Peruvian Creole Nationalism and Its
 Contemporary Crisis, 28 J. LATIN AM. STUDIES 197, 205 (1996).
 162. Santa Cruz did temporarily succeed in creating a Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation. The
 Confederation combined three separate states: Northern Peru, Southern Peru, and Bolivia
 through an economic alliance in October 1836. A fundamental law promulgated in 1837
 supranational^ governed the confederation and defined citizenship as common among the three.
 See La Ley Fundamental de la Confederaci?n Per?-Boliviana, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/
 ntley/Imagenes/Constitu/Lcpbl 837.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005). Each individual state was
 also reportedly "given" a constitution by Santa Cruz. Lane Carter Kendall, Andres Santa Cruz
 and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, 16 HlSP. AM. HlST. Rev. 29, 40-41 (1936). Generally,
 however, the split of Peru into two states undermined the larger Peruvian national project and
 subjugated Peru to Bolivia. M?ndez, supra note 161, at 205.
 163. In fact, adversaries to the Confederation would later call their eventual victory over
 Santa Cruz a second independence. Id. at 213.
 164. Id. The characterization of Santa Cruz was based more on his family ties through an
 Aymara mother than a reflection of his actual policies towards Indians. He was better at
 winning political support from indigenous sectors than his Creole detractors but was not
 necessarily any more inclusive of them. Id. at 215. In fact, the fundamental law that Santa Cruz
 devised to govern the Bolivian-Peruvian confederation did not provide any more extensive
 citizenship provisions than the early Peruvian constitutions. See La Ley Fundamental de la
 Confederaci?n Per?-Boliviana, art. 4, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Constitu/
 Lcpbl837.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
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 After the fall of the Confederation, Creole nationalists worked hard to
 restore the constitutional order they had previously started to create.165 Once
 again, they faced the dilemma of Indian inclusion. Though they espoused
 noble ideals of liberty, equality, and liberal rights, the Creole nationalists
 largely used anti-Indian rhetoric in their campaign to defeat Santa Cruz.
 Peruvian constitutions continued to reflect the tension between equality and
 indigenous exclusion.166 The 1839 Constitution returned to the language ofthe
 1828 Constitution by defining the nation as the political association of
 Peruvians.167 At the same time, it vastly changed how citizenship was defined
 by creating a two-tiered system of citizenship similar to the distinction between
 nationality and citizenship in earlier constitutions. First, it used early
 definitions of nationality to define citizens as males naturalized, born in Peru,
 or having a Peruvian parent.168 Then it divided citizenship into subclasses by
 reviving some ofthe old status requirements for citizenship embodied in earlier
 constitutions. Those who would be able to vote and participate fully in the
 polity had to meet age, marriage, literacy, property ownership, and employment
 requirements.169 If an individual could not meet these requirements, he would
 not be able to participate. This distinction, much like those between citizens
 and nationals in earlier constitutions, excluded many Indians.
 The 1839 Constitution challenged the formal inclusion but actual exclusion
 of indigenous peoples by providing for a temporary exception to the literacy
 requirement for Indians in regions where there were no primary schools.170
 Although this literacy exemption was to expire a few years later in 1844, it
 reflects continued divisions within Creole nationalism about the place of
 165. M?ndez, supra note 161, at 215 ("The process of restructuring the Peruvian state
 following the Confederation's defeat was called a 'restoration' in its day.").
 166. The post 1839 consolidation led to what is often considered the paradox of Creole
 nationalism, namely that the cre?les built a nation by rejecting the Indians who composed a
 majority ofthe person living in it. Id. at 219.
 167. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1839 art. 1, at http://www.congreso.gob.
 pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1839.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) ("La Naci?n Peruana es
 la asociaci?n pol?tica de todos los peruanos."). It also reinserted the earlier assertions of
 Peruvian independence. Id. at art. 2 ("La Naci?n Peruana es libre e independiente: no puede
 ser patrimonio de ninguna persona ni familia, ni hacer con otro Estado pacto alguno, que se
 oponga a su independencia y unidad.").
 168. Id. at arts. 4-6.
 169. Id. at art. 8.
 170. Id. at art. 8 ? 2 ("Saber leer y escribir, excepto los ind?genas y mestizos, hasta el a?o
 de 1844, en las poblaciones donde no hubiere escuelas de instrucci?n primaria."); see also
 Chambers, supra note 91, at 223 ("[I]n the early republic, literacy requirements were waived
 for indigenous and mestizo citizens.").
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 Indians in the new Republic. Creoles enacted a constitution formally extending
 the vote to some Indians just after using a racially exclusive definition ofthe
 nation to defeat Santa Cruz.171 Despite "official" and formal inclusion in the
 1839 Constitution, few doubt that most Indians continued to be excluded from
 participation in Peruvian politics.172
 The literacy exemption allowing illiterate Indians to vote was a short-lived
 experiment that would not resolve the question of where Indians fit within the
 Peruvian constitutional structure. The literacy exemption was removed in 1856
 and not reintroduced even though other restrictions on citizenship remained
 intact.173 The literacy requirements for citizenship vanished from the
 constitution entirely in 1867, but the other restrictions did not.174 The loss of
 the literacy requirement did not ensure Indian participation as they still had to
 meet the other requirements for citizenship. Further while restrictions on
 citizenship eased, new statutory qualifications for the franchise were enacted
 171. M?ndez, supra note 161, at 213.
 172. See, e.g., BARI?, supra note 9, at 474 ("Sin embargo, pese a todos estos vaivenes
 pol?ticos e ideol?gicos, del an?lisis de las constituciones republicanas del siglo XIX se
 desprende una tendencia pr?cticamente inmutable: la exclusion sistem?tica de los ind?genas del
 ejercicio ciudadano.").
 173. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1856 art. 37, at http .//www. congreso,
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/consl 856.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("El sufragio popular
 es directo: lo ejercen los ciudadanos que saben leer y escribir, o son jefes de taller, o tienen una
 propiedad ra?z, o se han retirado, conforme a la ley, despu?s de haber servido en el Ej?rcito o
 Armada.").
 The 1860 Constitution also reiterated these citizenship restrictions. Constituci?n Pol?tica
 de la Rep?blica Peruana 1860, art. 38, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/
 consl860.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005). Both of these constitutions retained the strong
 language of a unified nationalism expressed in the 1839 Constitution and the emphasis on
 individual rights expressed in earlier nineteenth century constitutions. Constituci?n Pol?tica de
 la Rep?blica Peruana 1856, art. 1, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons
 1856.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("La Naci?n Peruana es la asociaci?n pol?tica de todos los
 peruanos"); id. at art. 31 ("Las leyes protegen y obligan igualmente a todos: podr?n establecerse
 leyes especiales porque lo requiera la naturaleza de los objetos pero no por solo la diferencia
 de personas."); Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1860, art. 1, at http://www.
 congreso.gob.pe/debate_constimcional.htm (visited Feb. 7, 2004) ("La Naci?n Peruana es la
 asociaci?n pol?tica de todos los peruanos"); id. at art. 32 (same as 1856 Const., art. 31)
 174. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1867, art. 39, at http.V/www.congreso.
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1867.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("El sufragio popular
 es directo: gozan de este derecho todos los ciudadanos en ejercicio."). It also de-emphasized
 nationalism. Like all the constitutions ofthe nineteenth century, it protected individual rights
 and equality under the law. Id. at art. 30.
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 and applied to citizens.175 Thus, even Indians who could become citizens could
 not participate in the political community.
 Peru's early constitutions indicate that the tension identified in the 1822
 letter remained unresolved throughout the nineteenth century. Creoles during
 the nineteenth century used constitutional provisions defining citizenship and
 nationality to address whether and how Indians fit into the new republic. They
 wrote constitutions, which conveyed the ideal of a unified nation of all
 Peruvians, but divided nationality and citizenship. Nationality with its few
 privileges was extended to many while citizenship with its many privileges was
 limited to very few. While Creoles used these provisions to craft several
 responses to the tension in the 1822 letter, none of their attempts resolved it.
 The shifts in the definition of citizenship in these constitutions indicate that
 the tensions in the 1822 letter continued to pervade constitutional politics.
 Uncertainty remained about how to treat Indians and whether to include them
 constitutionally in the nation by extending citizenship to them. Each
 constitution responded to the tension in its own way and all expressed
 ambivalence about the inclusion of Indians in the Peruvian political
 community. Although these constitutions left open the possibility of Indian
 citizenship at least for some, they ignored the economic, social, and educational
 discrimination that pervaded the daily lives of Indians and prevented them from
 attaining citizenship. These constitutions provided citizenship and full
 participation to a limited few, ambiguity towards some, and exclusion for the
 vast majority.
 Ultimately the rise of the Aristocratic Republic at the end of the century
 solidified an anti-Indian Creole nationalism in Peru. But this would occur only
 after decades of varied attempts to address the tension in the 1822 letter. The
 Aristocratic Republic would exclude the majority of the population from
 political participation and be referred to later as * a republic without citizens. '176
 Few doubt that for the majority ofthe nineteenth century, Indians remained
 problematic for Creole Peru. Indians were largely unimagined and outside of
 175. Indians were also marginalized in the politics ofthe emerging party system. See
 generally Julio Cotler, Political Parties and the Problems of Democratic Consolidation in Peru
 335, in Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America (Scott
 Mainwaring & Timothy Scully eds., 1995). For more on the historical exclusion of indigenous
 peoples in Peru, see Maria Isabel Remy, The Indigenous Population and Construction of
 Democracy in Peru 107, in INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND DEMOCRACY IN Latin AMERICA (Donna
 Lee Van Cott ed., 1994).
 176. L?pez, supra note 106, at 217; see also WALKER, supra note 55, at 223 (noting the
 liberal assault on Indian communities at the end ofthe nineteenth century).
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 the nation created by political elites and the constitutional order simply did not
 know how to treat them.177
 2. The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Indigenous
 Peoples in Twentieth Century Peruvian Constitutional Politics
 The twentieth century inherited many of the identity problems of the
 nineteenth century and these issues continued to shape constitutional politics.178
 The challenges to nationalism, foreshadowed by the 1822 letter, would increase
 in complexity during the twentieth century as identities and identity politics
 changed and diversified.179 Early in the century, the question of how to include
 indigenous peoples faced new challenges, as indigenous peoples demanded
 recognition of their collective rights. Thus, the tension took on a new
 dimension about whether to define indigenous peoples as individual citizens or
 to recognize their rights as autonomous groups. This new dimension reshaped
 the contours ofthe old debate and introduced a new response to the question
 of indigenous inclusion. By the end of the twentieth century, constitution
 makers had resolved that indigenous peoples belonged to the Peruvian
 constitutional community and the focus shifted to the question of how
 indigenous peoples should be included in that community. Despite these
 changes, the ambivalence towards indigenous peoples in the 1822 letter would
 neither be abandoned nor fully resolved. Instead it would continue to frame a
 constitutional order uncertain about the relationship between Creoles and
 Indians.
 The emergence of indigenous movements and their demands for land
 challenged Creole nationalism and prompted Peruvian constitution-makers to
 revisit the question of the place of indigenous peoples in the constitution
 several times during the twentieth century. 18? The 1920 Constitution responded
 177. M?ndez, supra note 161, at 221 -22; Thurner, supra note 60, at 12 ("The contemporary
 Indian remained unimagined"); Jean Piel, The Place ofthe Peasantry in the National Live of
 Peru in the Nineteenth Century, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1970, at 108 (issue number 46); BARI?,
 supra note 9, at 474.
 178. L?pez, supra note 106, at 219.
 179. For instance, agrarian reform policies ofthe 1960s and 1970s would define rural
 identity by class rather than ethnicity. Later indigenous movements would challenge class
 identity as predominant. Further, urban migration altered identity entirely. For an in-depth
 discussion of these changes, see L?pez, supra note 106, at 219-29.
 180. Raquel Yrigoyen Fajardo, Peru: Pluralist Constitution, Monist Judiciary - A Post
 Reform Assessment, in MuLTicuLTURALiSM in Latin America: Indigenous Rights,
 Diversity and Democracy 160 (Rachel Sieder ed., 2002). For more information on the
 indigenist revival in the early nineteenth century, see Marisol de la Cadena, The Political
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 to these new movements by recognizing indigenous communities and their
 inalienable rights to communal lands.181 The constitutional recognition of
 communal indigenous land rights did not resolve the tension in the 1822 letter
 but introduced a new element to the debate. While previously political elites
 had envisioned an individual-based model of inclusion through citizenship and
 the extension of individual rights, they now faced questions of collective rights.
 Despite a century old aspiration of individual equality, elites continued to deny
 indigenous peoples the franchise while extending collective rights to them.182
 Thus, the constitutional tension identified in the 1822 letter shifted in 1920
 from one solely concerned with individual rights to one open to collective
 indigenous rights.
 This shift added a twist to the tension by creating a new question about
 whether indigenous peoples should be treated as individuals or groups. The
 recognition of collective indigenous rights appeared counter to ideals of
 individual equality. The 1920 Constitution revived the language of a unified,
 national state used in the 1839, 1856, and 1860 Constitutions.183 It also
 reiterated the importance of equality under the law and the rights of the
 individual.184 The privileging of the unified nation and the rights of the
 individual existed in tension with the new acknowledgement of collective rights
 specific to indigenous peoples, which were based on the recognition of peoples
 Tensions of Representations and Misrepresentations: Intellectuals and Mestizas in Cuzco (1919
 1990), 2 J. Latin Am. Anthropology 112-47 ( 1996); Marisol de la Cadena, De Raza a Clase:
 La Insurgencia Intelectual Provinciana en el Per? (1910-1970), in LOS SENDEROS INS?LITOS
 del Per?, 1980-1995 (Steven J. Stern ed., 1998).
 181. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1920, art. 41 ("Los bienes de propiedad
 del Estado, de instituciones p?blicas y de comunidades de ind?genas son imprescriptibles y s?lo
 podr?n transferirse mediante t?tulo p?blico, en los casos y en la forma que establezca la ley"),
 art. 58 ("El Estado proteger? a la raza ind?gena y dictar? leyes especiales para su desarrollo y
 cultura en armon?a con sus necesidades. La Naci?n reconoce la existencia legal de las
 comunidades de ind?genas y la ley declarar? los derechos que les correspondan"), at http://
 www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/consl920.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005).
 182. L?pez, supra note 106, at 234 ("A partir de los a?os veinte las nuevas elites
 modernizantes vinculadas al leguiismo, los nuevos sectores intelectuales y los movimientos
 indigenistas contribuyeron a que el Estado se declarara protector de la raza ind?gena, impulsara
 el reconocimiento formal de su cultura, reconociera su organizaci?n comunal, pero la excluyera
 de la participaci?n pol?tica al exigir a los votantes el status de contribuyentes, la condici?n de
 alfabetos y hombres mayors de 21 a?os.").
 183. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1920, art. 1, at http://www.congreso.gob.
 pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1920.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2005) ("La Naci?n Peruana es
 la asociaci?n pol?tica de todos los peruanos").
 184. Id. at art. 17 & Titulo III.
 No. 1 ] PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS  45
 or groups rather than equality among individuals.185 This development altered
 the debate in Peruvian society about the proper place of indigenous peoples by
 raising the issue of whether to recognize collective or individual rights or
 both.186 For the first time constitution-makers appeared to recognize that
 indigenous peoples belonged to the Peruvian political community, but how to
 include them was far from clear and their constitutionally ambiguous status
 continued.
 The 1933 Constitution continued the indeterminacy. The constitution was
 rewritten in 1933 after the fall ofthe dictator Leguia to signify a new legal
 regime but little changed in the constitution. Instead the 1933 Constitution
 basically copied the 1920 Constitution.187 By reiterating many ofthe same
 provisions enacted in the 1920 Constitution, the 1933 Constitution left intact
 the conflict between equal treatment of individuals under the law and the
 recognition of indigenous rights.
 Questions of the constitutional status of indigenous peoples gained new
 importance in the years between the 1933 and 1979 constitutions. The place
 185. BARI?, swpra note 9, at 475.
 186. See e.g., Will Kymlicka, Three Forms of Group-Differentiated Citizenship in Canada,
 /?Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political 163 (Seyla
 Benhabib ed., 1996).
 187. Bari?, supra note 9, at 477. It reiterated the emphasis on equality among individuals,
 Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1933, art. 23, at http://www.congreso.gob.pe/
 ntley/imagenes/constitu/consl 933.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("La Constituci?n y las leyes
 protegen y obligan igualmente a todos los habitantes de la Rep?blica. Podr?n expedirse leyes
 especiales porque lo exija la naturaleza de las cosas, pero no por las diferencias de personas."),
 lowered the age of citizenship to eighteen years but kept the other restrictions on citizenship and
 voting, id. at arts. 84-86, recognized the distinct legal status of indigenous communities, id. at
 art. 207 ("Las comunidades ind?genas tienen existencia legal y personer?a juridical."), and
 obligated the state to protect indigenous communal property rights, id. at art. 208 ("El Estado
 garantiza la integridad de la propiedad de las comunidades. La ley organizar? el catastro
 correspondiente."); id. art. 209 ("La propiedad de las comunidades es imprescriptible en
 inenaj enable, salvo el caso de expropiaci?n por causa de utilidad p?blica, previa indemnizaci?n.
 Es, asimismo, inembargable"). In addition to these provisions, it attempted to deal with a
 tension in the 1920 document between indigenous communities and municipalities by
 addressing the powers ofthe municipalities vis-?-vis indigenous communities. Id. at art. 210
 ("Los Concejos Municipales ni corporaci?n o autoridad alguna intervendr?n en la recaudaci?n
 ni en la administraci?n de las rentas y bienes de las comunidades."). The 1933 Constitution also
 somewhat undermined the communal property rights it recognized by allowing the state to
 procure excess indigenous lands. Id. at art. 211 ("El Estado procurar? de preferencia adjudicar
 tierras a las comunidades de ind?genas que no las tengan en cantidad suficiente para las
 necesidades de su poblaci?n, y podr? expropiar, con tal prop?sito, las tierras de propiedad
 privada conforme a lo dispuesto en el p?rrafo segundo del art?culo 29.").
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 of indigenous peoples in the nation changed in 1974 with explicit discussions
 about how native Amazonians fit into the legal structure.188 Ultimately these
 discussions culminated in the enactment of the 1974 Law of Native
 Communities, which acknowledged the rights of Amazonian Indians to
 territorial and sub-soil rights and the legal rights of these communities to
 resolve their own internal disputes.189 An advance for Andean indigenous
 peoples also came in 1975 when Peru finally fulfilled the promise originally
 made in the 1822 letter and recognized their language, Quechua, as an official
 language.190
 Constitutional negotiations in the late 1970s provided a space for resolving
 the question of how indigenous peoples were to be included in the
 constitutional order. The 1979 Constitution, however, retained many ofthe
 contradictions in earlier constitutions and reflected the tension between
 indigenous peoples and the state identified in the 1822 letter. President General
 Juan Velasco Alvarado advocated agrarian reforms that rejected indigenous
 peoples as a salient identity group and identified them as "campesinos"
 (peasants) rather than indigenous peoples. While this definitional change
 privileged class identities over other ones, the question of Amazonian
 indigenous groups had surfaced for the first time in the 1979 constitutional
 debates and their existence reiterated claims of indigenous communal
 identity.191 After much debate, a new chapter on indigenous peoples was added
 to the Constitution even though the emphasis on individual rights was retained.
 The inclusion of recognitions of both indigenous rights and individual rights
 reaffirmed the indeterminacy towards indigenous peoples that started with the
 1822 letter. Constitution-makers were still unsure as to whether to include
 indigenous peoples as individuals or communities, and the debate continued
 about how to include indigenous peoples and whether to recognize their claims
 to collective rights.192
 188. Yrigoyen Fajardo, supra note 180, at 161.
 189. Id.
 190. BARI?, supra note 9, at 478-79.
 191. Indigenous social movements were also forming throughout the Andean region (mainly
 in neighboring Ecuador and Bolivia) at this time. See generally XAVIER Albo, Los PUEBLOS
 INDIOS en la Pol?tica (2002); Deborah Yashar, Democracy, Indigenous Movements, and the
 Postliberal Challenge in Latin America, 52 WORLD POLITICS 76 (1999); HENRI FAVRE, El
 Indigenismo (1998).
 192. Debate continues about the recognitions of indigenous rights incorporated in the 1979
 Constitution and whether they increased or decreased the rights of indigenous peoples.
 Yrigoyen Fajardo asserts that the 1979 Constitution rejected the notion of legal pluralism and
 returned Peru to a state of legal monism. Yrigoyen Fajardo, supra note 180, at 162. Bari?
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 The 1979 Constitution illustrated the indeterminate place of indigenous
 peoples through its inconsistent treatment of indigenous peoples as equal
 citizens and semi-autonomous groups. In this way, it furthered the ambiguous
 constitutional narrative. It both reiterated and limited the recognitions of
 indigenous rights codified in the earlier 1920 and 1933 Constitutions and did
 not resolve the tension between the recognition of indigenous rights and
 equality before the law that first arose in the 1920 Constitution.193 The 1979
 Constitution recognized the importance of indigenous languages,194
 acknowledged the distinct status of indigenous communities, continued the
 restrictions on the sale of communal indigenous property,195 and expanded
 protections of indigenous culture.196 At the same time, it limited the ability of
 indigenous communities to resolve their own disputes and stated that these
 indigenous protections depended largely on their development and enforcement
 through statutes.197 The 1979 Constitution included a new provision on
 indigenous development, which was to be promoted by the state,198 but aside
 contends that the 1979 Constitution greatly expanded indigenous rights. BARI?, supra note 9,
 at 479-82. The two scholars also disagree on the effects ofthe 1993 Constitution. Bari? argues
 that the 1993 Constitution greatly undermined the indigenous rights previously included in the
 1979 Constitution, id. at 482-83, while Yrigoyen Fajardo claims that the 1993 Constitution
 moved Peru away from legal monism and towards legal pluralism for the first time, Yrigoyen
 Fajardo, supra note 180, at 167-71.
 193. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1979, art. 2 ? 2, at http://www.congreso.
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1979.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("A la igualdad ante
 la ley, sin discriminaci?n alguna por raz?n de sexo, raza, religi?n, opini?n e idioma.").
 194. Id. at art. 35 ("El Estado promueve el estudio y conocimiento de las lenguas abor?genes.
 Garantiza el derecho de las comunidades quechuas, aymara y dem?s comunidades nativas a
 recibir educaci?n primaria tambi?n en su propio idioma o lengua.").
 195. Id. at art. 163 ("Las tierras de las Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas son
 inembargables e imprescriptibles. Tambi?n son inalienables, salvo ley fundada en el inter?s de
 la Comunidad, y solicitada por una mayor?a de los dos tercios de los miembros calificados de
 esta, o en caso de expropiaci?n por necesidad y utilidad publicas. En ambos casos con pago
 previo en dinero. Queda prohibido el acaparamiento de tierras dentro de la Comunidad.").
 196. Id. at art. 34 ("El Estado preserva y estimula las manifestaciones de las culturas nativas,
 as? como las peculiares y genuinas del folklore nacional, el arte popular y la artesan?a").
 197. Id. at art. 161 ("La Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas tienen existencia legal y
 personer?a jur?dica. Son aut?nomas en su organizaci?n, trabajo comunal y uso de la tierra, as?
 como en lo econ?mico y administrativo dentro del marco que la ley establece. El Estado respeta
 y protege las tradiciones de las Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas. Propicia las superaci?n
 cultural de sus integrantes.").
 198. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1979, art. 162, at http://www.congreso.
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1979.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("El Estado promueve
 el desarrollo integral de las Comunidades Campesinas y Nativas. Fomentan las empresas
 comunales y cooperatives.").
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 from making indigenous lands inalienable, it did not protect indigenous
 communities from the possible harms of development.199
 These provisions existed in awkward juxtaposition to a constitutional focus
 on equality before the law that specifically targeted certain kinds of
 discrimination as illegal. The Constitution listed several suspect categories of
 discrimination, including sex, race, religion, opinions, and beliefs.200 The
 specific listing of race as a proscribed category of discrimination created an
 even starker tension between the state's desire for equality under the law and
 its protections of indigenous rights. If the state actually desired the end of all
 racial discrimination, whether benign or invidious, then the anti-discrimination
 provisions could negate indigenous rights if they were perceived as race
 based.201
 The indeterminate position of indigenous peoples also emerged in the 1979
 Constitution's dual emphasis on national political integration and indigenous
 autonomy. The Constitution removed literacy requirements from voter
 eligibility and fully enfranchised indigenous peoples.202 The enfranchisement
 of indigenous peoples signaled a move towards the political integration of
 indigenous peoples into the Peruvian state. While full enfranchisement
 199. Id.
 200. Id.
 201. I do not mean to suggest that the recognition of indigenous rights necessarily
 contradicts equality rights ? only that it could. Peru's lack of attention to the potential conflict
 is what concerns me here. Peruvian constitutions provide no guidance on the relationship
 between equality and indigenous rights, leaving open the door for arguments that indigenous
 rights are racially based, and thus, unconstitutional. Consider, in contrast, Canada's
 constitutional recognition of Aboriginal rights. Canada recognizes Aboriginal rights as based
 upon a government-to-government relationship between Aboriginal nations and the Canadian
 government initiated by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. See generally supra note 49. This
 government-to-government relationship is political, not racial, and thus, not in conflict with
 Canada's equality protections. Id. While not constitutionally based, the United States has made
 similar arguments in regard to its relationship with Indian tribes. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S.
 535 (1974).
 202. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1979, art. 65, at http://www.congreso.
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/cons 1979.pdf (last visited Oct. 10,2005) ("Son ciudadanos los
 peruanos mayores de dieciocho a?os. Para el ejercicio de la ciudadan?a se requiere estar inscrito
 en el Registro Electoral. Tienen derecho a votar todos los ciudadanos que est?n en el goce de
 su capacidad civil. El voto es personal, igual, libre, secreto y obligatorio hasta los setenta a?os.
 Es facultativo despu?s de esta edad. En las elecciones pluripersonales, hay representaci?n
 proporcional, conforme al sistema que establece la ley."); Bari?, supra note 9, at 480 ("Los
 derechos pol?ticos de los ind?genas, antes que nada, se plasman en la inclusi?n (indirecta) de
 esta poblaci?n al electorado com?n: a m?s de 150 a?os de la primera Constituci?n republicana,
 los analfabetos, finalmente adquieren el derecho a acudir a las urnas.").
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 clarified that indigenous peoples belonged to the Peruvian political community
 and resolved some of the ambivalence in the constitutional order, it did not
 resolve how to include indigenous peoples but exacerbated the tension between
 indigenous autonomy and individual rights. To some extent, the granting of
 political inclusion through enfranchisement, the most fundamental ofthe liberal
 individual political rights, undermines arguments made by some indigenous
 groups for recognition of and respect for their own political autonomy separate
 from the Peruvian state.203 The tension between assimilation and autonomy
 was further evident in the 1979 Constitution as it continued to define Peru as
 a monocultural nation while extending protections of indigenous culture.204
 These three constitutional acts ? the protection of equality, the
 enfranchisement of indigenous peoples, and monocultural national definition,
 suggest that a policy of assimilation persisted despite the formal recognition of
 specific indigenous rights.205 The 1979 Constitution may have resolved the
 indeterminacy of whether indigenous peoples belonged to the political
 community by extending enfranchisement and full political rights to them but
 the debate over how to include them continued. The tension between the
 acknowledgement of a distinct place for indigenous peoples and
 integrationist/assimilationist aspirations indicates that the Peruvian national and
 constitutional project has not resolved the question of how to include
 indigenous peoples raised in the 1822 letter.
 The 1993 Constitution reinforced the confusion about how to include
 indigenous peoples in the political community left by the 1979 Constitution.
 The Constitution was reformed in 1993 primarily to suit the political ambitions
 of President Alberto Fujimori.206 Much like in 1979, indigenous rights were on
 the agenda and included in the final document. The 1993 Constitution, like
 many of the other Peruvian constitutions, represents the hesitant "one step
 forward, two steps back" approach towards indigenous peoples apparent since
 203. For more on this kind of tension, see Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in
 Multiculturalism Examining the Politics of Recognition 25-74 (Amy Guttman ed.,
 Princeton Univ. Press 1994); Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solicitudes Essays on
 Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (1993); Will Kymlicka, supra note 186, at 153-70.
 204. Bari?, supra note 9, at 481.
 205. After enactment ofthe 1979 Constitution, organizations published books to inform the
 Amazonian indigenous peoples about their rights. The books look like civics books for
 elementary schools. They appear to explain the constitutional recognitions of aboriginal rights
 to the natives and encourage their participation in elections. They demonstrate further
 aspirations for the inclusion of Indigenous peoples into a national political community.
 206. Maria McFarland Sanchez-Moreno, Note: When a "Constitution" Is a Constitution:
 Focus on Peru, 33 N.Y.U. J. Int'lL. & POL. 561, 563-64 (2001).
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 the 1822 letter in Peru.207 On one hand, the 1993 Constitution repeats the
 language of equality before the law present in its 1979 predecessor208 and
 unequivocally describes the Peruvian state as singular and indivisible.209 Thus,
 it presents the nation as unified and monocultural with inclusion occurring
 through citizenship and equal rights. On the other hand, it simultaneously
 protects ethnic identity in general,210 recognizes indigenous languages as
 official languages in areas where they are dominant,211 confirms legal
 recognition and the inalienability of indigenous communal lands,212 and extends
 recognition of indigenous jurisdiction over community disputes.213 While these
 rights are not unlimited, they suggest inclusion through the recognition of
 separate indigenous communities.214
 These contrary provisions and the limitations on the rights of indigenous
 groups indicate the state's continued uncertainty about how to include
 indigenous peoples in the constitutional political community. They suggest
 that the state is not prepared to abandon completely its long standing devotion
 to the integration or assimilation of indigenous peoples into the Peruvian
 political community.215 Instead, the position towards indigenous peoples within
 the Constitution remains unclear and vacillates much like in the original 1822
 letter.
 The debate over the place of indigenous groups and their rights under the
 constitution continues today with the reforms presented to the current
 Constitutional Commission, which was formed in 2001 by interim President
 207. Roque Roldan & Ana Mar?a Camayo, Legislaci?n y Derechos Ind?genas en el
 Per? 57 (1996).
 208. Constituci?n Pol?tica de la Rep?blica Peruana 1993, art. 2, ? 2, at http://www.congreso.
 gob.pe/ntley/imagenes/constitu/consl993.pdf(last visited Oct. 10,2005). By 1993, some ofthe
 language of indigenous rights almost appears to be boilerplate for Peruvian Constitutions and
 retained without much debate.
 209. Id. at art. 43.
 210. M at art. 2, ?19.
 211. Id. at art. 48.
 212. Id. at arts. 88-89.
 213. M at art. 149.
 214. For instance, in protecting indigenous communal lands as inalienable, the 1993
 Constitution also gives the state the right to claim abandoned lands, id. at art. 88, and identifies
 the nation as the possessor of all natural resources, id. at art. 66. Similarly, the right of
 indigenous communities to exercise their own jurisdictional authority in resolving disputes is
 limited because such judicial processes cannot violate fundamental human rights. Id. at art.
 149.
 215. Bare, supra note 9, at 485 ("casi cien anos de la Independencia, el Estado no ha
 abandonado la idea de ser 'uno e indivisible' e insiste en una finalidad integracionista.").
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 Valentin Paniagua to discuss potential reforms to the 1993 Constitution.216
 The Commission,217 composed of Peru's finest jurists, politicians, and
 constitutional law scholars produced a report called the Anteproyecto on April
 5, 2002.218 The Anteproyecto includes an entire chapter devoted to the rights
 ofthe Andean Pueblos, Amazonians, and Afro-Peruvian populations.219 Title
 Two Chapter Six contains proposals by the National Commission of Andean
 Pueblos and Amazonians, Congressman Luis Guerrero, and Congresswoman
 Martha Moyano.220 The most extensive proposal by the National Commission
 recommends vast recognitions of the rights of Andean and Amazonian
 indigenous peoples, including rights to land and minerals, bilingualism, cultural
 patrimony, autonomy, economic development, political participation, and the
 administration of justice.221 Additionally, it advocates the introduction of
 language ensuring the judicial enforcement of these rights.222 These proposals
 demonstrate the continued relevance ofthe debate over the place of indigenous
 peoples in the Peruvian constitutional polity and the persistent ambivalence
 about how to treat them. The question now is whether the latest round of
 constitutional reforms will finally answer the tough questions about how
 indigenous peoples should be included or if it will continue to leave these
 questions unresolved.
 This short history lesson illustrates the legacy of the 1822 letter. The
 constitutions of Peru show how the tension in the 1822 letter started a
 longstanding debate within Peruvian constitutional politics about the
 relationship between the state and its indigenous peoples. This comparative
 analysis of Peruvian Constitutions indicates that the question of how to include
 216. Carlos Lozada, Peru 's Never-ending Quest for the Perfect Constitution, CHRISTIAN SCI.
 Monitor, Sept. 24, 2002, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0924/p07s01-woam.
 htm. Fujimori fled Peru for Japan due to allegations of systemic corruption. Id. Paniagua's
 actions follow the traditional Latin American pattern of constitutional change as part of regime
 change. Paniagua sought to rid Peru ofthe vestiges ofthe Fujimori regime. Id.
 217. The full name ofthe commission is the Commission to Study the Bases for the
 Constitutional Reform of Peru, or El Comisi?n de Estudio de las Bases de la Reforma
 Constitutional del Per?.
 218. Comisi?n de Constituci?n, Reglamento y Acusaciones Constitucionales, Congreso de
 la Rep?blica, Anteproyecto de Ley de Reforma de la Constituci?n 58-62 (2002), available at
 http://www.congreso.gob.pe/comisiones/2002/debate_constitucional/anteproyecto.htm (last
 visited Oct. 10,2005).
 219. Title 2, Chapter 6 ofthe Anteproyecto is titled, "Ofthe Rights ofthe Andean Pueblos,
 Amazonians, and Afro-Pervian Populations." Id. at 58.
 220. Id. at 58-62.
 221. Id.
 222. See supra note 1.
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 indigenous peoples in the political community reemerged time and time again.
 Each new constitution responded to this tension as Peruvian constitution
 makers struggled to answer the questions of whether and how indigenous
 peoples are included in their political community.
 The 1822 letter can be read against the nineteenth century constitutions to
 suggest that the community clearly did not include Indians, who despite their
 collective constitutional recognition in the 1920s would be excluded as
 illiterates from joining the Republic in any participatory manner until the
 1970s. Such a reading, however, may obscure a more valuable point here about
 the ambiguities, tensions, and uncertainties that exist within the creation of
 imagined constitutional communities because it leaves out the recurrence ofthe
 question of inclusion and exclusion at that and later times. This comparison of
 the early constitutions indicates that the debate over who was part of the
 national community persisted throughout the nineteenth century and
 constitutional entitlements to the franchise and citizenship changed with each
 subsequent constitution. These continual constitutional changes suggest that
 the story is more complex and nuanced than a reading ofthe texts to exclude
 Indians indicates. A better reading of the nineteenth century constitutions
 highlights their struggles with indigenous inclusion and shows how they
 recreated the initial ambivalence towards indigenous peoples in the 1822 letter.
 In doing this, they reinforced and contributed to a constitutional order
 chronically indecisive about how to treat indigenous peoples.
 The twentieth century constitutions differed in their approach to the question
 of indigenous inclusion. While they introduced and developed the idea of
 collective indigenous rights, they failed to resolve the constitutional order's
 ambivalence over how to include indigenous peoples. Peruvian constitutional
 documents responded to the tensions in the 1822 letter in different ways but all
 entered into the dialogue, addressed the underlying tension, and added to the
 constitutional debate it started.
 While the 1822 letter has not received the same widespread acclaim as our
 Declaration of Independence, the Canadian Royal Proclamation, or New
 Zealand's Treaty of Waitangi, it can be used as diagnostic tool to identify and
 better understand a tension that was present at constitution-making and has
 remained unresolved today. Critical analysis of the letter shows that it
 identifies its main issue as the question of how to include indigenous peoples
 within the constitutional community. Comparison ofthe 1822 letter to later
 constitutional documents demonstrates that this question about the Peruvian
 political community has remained central to Peruvian constitutional politics and
 has historically framed persistent constitutional debates over who constitutes
 the Peruvian political community. An understanding of the 1822 letter
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 facilitates a more complete picture of the creation and debate over the
 constitutional status of indigenous peoples. It suggests the early origin ofthe
 repeated discussions over citizenship, nationality, and collective rights in
 Peruvian constitutionalism. Without acknowledging the letter and the role it
 has played in the creation of constitutional meaning in Peru, we lose a sense of
 the deep anxiety and historical conflict over the definition of the Peruvian
 constitutional community.
 Nearly two hundred years after production ofthe 1822 document, Peru
 continues to struggle with its relationship with indigenous peoples. The tension
 in the 1822 letter continues to be invoked in constitutional debates and
 discussions ofthe political community. In addition to identifying this tension,
 understanding the 1822 letter provides some insights into how the tension may
 be resolved. First, the 1822 letter suggests that this is not an easy tension to
 resolve. It presented more than one possible story about the community being
 created and it attempted, albeit inconsistently, to create a community by
 including Indians and appealing to them in the revolution against Spain. While
 it struggled with the place in the newly created nation of an "other" that it did
 not know how to define or include, it indicated that they could be included. It
 suggested that the question may be open to more than one creative solution.
 Second, the 1822 letter indicates the need to resolve the issue. It illustrates the
 longstanding duration of ethnic conflicts within a political community and
 suggests that if the issue is not taken seriously at this constitutional moment, it
 will persist.
 Conclusion
 Despite the vibrant fireworks displays and ticker tape parades ofthe Fourth
 of July, the status of pre-constitutional documents, including the beloved
 Declaration of Independence, remains in the dark. In the United States, at least
 we have reached the point of debating the legal force ofthe Declaration and
 other pre-constitutional documents.223 Pre-constitutional documents in other
 constitutional orders have not even had this much light shed on them. As
 precursors to final constitutions, pre-constitutional documents constitute a
 unique genre of constitutional documents and may provide key insights into the
 founding ofthe constitutional community. They deserve more attention than
 some of them have previously received and should be seriously considered by
 their respective constitutional orders.
 223. See supra note 1.
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 Pre-constitutional documents deserve to be the objects of critical discussion
 and analysis within contemporary constitutional orders because they help us to
 develop more comprehensive understandings of constitutionalism. While
 occasionally the tensions identified in pre-constitutional documents force the
 constitutional order to recognize their importance, as in the case ofthe Treaty
 of Waitangi in New Zealand or the Royal Proclamation in Canada, that is not
 always the case. Without critical analysis, the lessons contained in pre
 constitutional documents may be overlooked or lost. While not all pre
 constitutional documents highlight longstanding tensions within the
 constitutional policy, without critical analysis of these documents, we will not
 be able to determine which ones do.
 The critical analysis of pre-constitutional documents often reveals the
 important role they play in contemporary constitutional politics. Pre
 constitutional documents may serve as diagnostic tools for identifying and
 better understanding constitutional tensions that remain unresolved to the
 present. The tensions identified by pre-constitutional documents are not
 forgotten or abandoned once a constitution is drafted. Rather these early
 tensions often reemerge in constitutional debates.
 As this case study ofthe 1822 letter shows, the critical analysis of pre
 constitutional documents is key to understanding their importance to
 contemporary constitutional politics. The exploration of pre-constitutional
 documents unravels the historical layers of the constitutional order and the
 constitutionalism it has fostered by providing a window into the social
 construction of meaning in the constitution and the community it was designed
 to govern. Pre-constitutional documents provide background to later debates
 and illustrate their origin and continued importance in the constitutional
 dialogue.
 By understanding pre-constitutional documents and their social context, we
 gain insights into how subsequent constitutional debates responded to these
 early constitutional tensions. Developing this understanding facilitates fuller
 comprehension of contemporary constitutional issues because it provides us
 with a lens through which to see the problem. The study of pre-constitutional
 documents enhances our understanding of our constitutional origins, increases
 the depth of our knowledge of our most salient constitutional debates, and
 encourages us to develop solutions to longstanding constitutional tensions.
